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ABSTRACT
In this dissertation, I investigate the impact that corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) engagement may have on post-acquisition performance outcomes. I argue that 
prospective targets are among the audiences that observe the firm’s corporate social 
activities and make judgments out of the signals portrayed by such activity. With 
prospective targets being largely more successful than their counterparts, it stands to 
reason that they would prefer to be acquired by successful firms that would likely assure 
benefits in the long term. The socially responsible acquirer would likely be viewed as the 
more attractive suitor since the established moral and reputational capital present it as the 
more trustworthy partner in the deal. I contend that, all else equal, a quality target may 
prefer to be acquired by a socially responsible firm as the acquired firm can gain 
immediate access to the acquirer’s reputational and moral capital benefits. Acquisition of 
such high quality targets is likely to lead to the attainment o f synergies which could 
enhance post-acquisition performance.
I examine this issue by relying on literature on stakeholder theory and signaling 
theory in order to understand how firms could shape the perceptions of prospective 
quality targets in their favor, through engagement in corporate social responsibility. I 
explore entrepreneurial firms, family firms and top managers’ ownership as potential 
moderators to the relationship. Further, I explore top management team retention and
quality of target as mediators of the relationship between CSR and post-acquisition 
performance.
In testing the hypotheses, I rely on data from the Kinder, Lydenberg, and Domini 
(KLD) database, the Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) module of the Securities Data 
Corporation’s (SDC) database, Research Insight and S&P’s Capital IQ databases, and the 
firms’ filings with the SEC.
The first major finding is that corporate social performance is generally 
associated with higher post-acquisition performance. I find a positive relationship 
between corporate social responsibility and financial performance measured by ROA. 
However, no significant performance results are found when performance is measured 
using total shareholder return, a market measure. The results provide support for the 
moderating effect o f entrepreneurial firm status on the relationship between the acquirer's 
corporate social performance and the quality o f target. The results also provide support 
for the mediating effect o f the quality o f target on the relationship between CSR and 
organizational performance.
This dissertation has important theoretical and practical contributions. First, this 
research extends prior CSR literature to the acquisitions context and shows that CSR 
engagement is associated with financial performance. It therefore establishes a stronger 
theoretical foundation for the relationship between corporate social performance and 
financial performance. Secondly, this study looks at prospective targets as additional 
stakeholders that rely on a prospective acquirer’s CSR information to form impressions 
about potential acquirers. This study indeed finds that a firm’s engagement in CSR is an
important signaling mechanism through which prospective acquirers portray themselves 
as more trustworthy business partners to prospective quality targets. Additionally, prior 
M&A literature has primarily investigated performance phenomena from an acquirer’s 
perspective. This study goes further and develops arguments from the target’s 
perspective, arguing that the targets are a primary recipient of signals from prospective 
acquirers, and that they rely on information from such signals to make important 
decisions, like which acquirer would be most favorable in an acquisition deal.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Merger and acquisition (M&A) activity significantly accelerated in the U.S. in 
2014 and 2015, and the trend is poised to continue if  not accelerate further in many 
industries among public and private firms (Deloitte, 2014; Deloitte, 2015). With a 
substantial body of extant literature suggesting that the anticipated synergies from M&As 
are largely left unrealized (Datta, Pinches, & Narayanan, 1992; King, Dalton, Daily, & 
Covin, 2004), the expected increase in M&A activity lends impetus for more research 
inquiry in this area.
Similarly, research attention to corporate social responsibility (CSR) issues has 
been on the increase. Dominating this inquiry are studies on the link between CSR and 
corporate performance (CP). However, inconsistencies have plagued study findings on 
the CSR-CP relationship, with some concluding that the relationship is positive (Wang & 
Qian, 2011; Waddock & Graves, 1997a), negative (Julian & Ofori-dankwa, 2013), 
neutral (McWilliams & Siegel, 2000), or U shaped (Barnett & Salomon, 2012; Brammer 
& Millington, 2008; Wang, Choi, & Li, 2008). Despite the mixed findings, research 
suggests that involvement with CSR is o f strategic value to firms (Porter & Kramer, 
2002; Saiia, 2002) due to its capacity to improve stakeholder relations (McWilliams & 
Siegel, 2001) which subsequently leads to positive outcomes for the firm.
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To date, despite the abundance of studies examining the effect of CSR, and 
acquisitions, on corporate performance, important gaps still remain unaddressed in the 
literature. First, to the best of my knowledge, no study has examined the effect of CSR on 
acquisition performance. This is a very significant omission in the literature, considering 
that CSR has been shown to influence many corporate outcomes such as organizational 
legitimacy (Fombrun et al., 2000; Holder-Webb et al. 2009; Jamali, 2008), reputation 
(Brammer & Pavelin, 2006; Brown & Dacin 1997; Fombrun, 1996; Fombrun & Shanley, 
1990; Turban & Greening, 1997; Versehoor, 1998; Waddock & Graves, 1997; Sen & 
Bhattacharya 2001), customer loyalty (Du, Bhattacharya, & Sankar, 2007; Lev, Petrovits, 
& Radhakrishnan, 2010; Luo & Bhattacharya, 2006; Sen & Bhattacharya, 2001), reduced 
firm risk (Bansal & Clelland, 2004; Godfrey et al., 2009; McGuire et al., 1988), 
operational efficiencies (Sharma & Vredenburg, 1998) and employee commitment 
(Greening & Turban, 2000). Second, acquisition performance literature remains unclear 
as to why the anticipated synergies from acquisitions are never realized (e.g. Datta et al., 
1992; King et al., 2004). In exploring why this is so, scholars have suggested that poor 
post-acquisition performance may be due to a reduction in R&D investment (Hitt, 
Hoskisson, Ireland, & Harrison, 1991), managerial hubris (Roll, 1986), integration 
problems (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991), and differences in organizational culture and 
management style (Chatterjee, Lubatkin, Schweiger, & Weber, 1992; Datta, 1991). 
However, to the best o f my knowledge, no attention has examined the effect o f CSR on 
acquisition performance. This paper integrates CSR and acquisition literature in an 
attempt to find out how they interrelate to influence acquisition performance.
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Stakeholder theory suggests that a firm’s stakeholders have the ability to affect or 
be affected by the strategic outcomes achieved by the firm (Freeman, 1984; Jones & 
Wicks, 1999). It follows that systematic managerial attention to stakeholder interests is 
critical to organizational success (Berman, Wicks, Kotha, & Jones, 1999; Clarkson, 1995; 
Choi & Shepherd, 2005). A firm’s participation in CSR is an important source of 
reputational capital, which boosts the firm’s attractiveness to various stakeholder groups 
such as prospective customers, employees, and business partners (Fischer & Reuber,
2007; Fombrun, 2001; Fombrun & Shanley, 1990; Jones, 1995; Puncheva, 2008). 
Reputational capital can boost stakeholder relations (McWilliams & Siegel, 2001) and is 
likely to be rewarded by key stakeholders, though, for example, positive security 
analysts’ assessments (Ioannou & Serafeim, 2015; Luo, Wang, Raithel, & Zheng, 2015), 
favorable job seekers’ perceptions of the firm (Jones, Willness, & Madey, 2014), lower 
cost o f capital (Sharfrnan & Fernando, 2008) and lower capital constraints (Cheng, 
Ioannou, & Serafeim, 2014), which could result in improved performance (Udayasankar, 
2008). Choi and Shepherd (2005) suggest that when stakeholder support is high, 
stakeholders are more likely to provide more of the resources required by the 
organization, and/or they may provide such resources in a way that lowers transaction 
costs for a longer period. At the core o f CSR engagement is its capacity to deliver valued 
positive stakeholder relations for the firm (Barnett, 2007).
Signaling theory (Spence, 1973) can also help to explain the positive outcomes of 
CSR. The theory explains the process utilized by decision makers in situations of 
information asymmetry (Spence, 1973). Studies suggest that due to the existence of 
information asymmetry, the public frequently relies on actions and symbols to judge a
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firm’s reputation and quality (Ferrier, 1997; Fombrun & Shanley, 1990; Miller & Triana, 
2009; Spence, 1973). Firms use these actions to provide information to the public with 
the aim of eventually influencing the public’s judgment on the firm (Ferrier, 1997;
Mahon, 2002). CSR activities are primarily meant to build reputation and status among 
the public (Miller & Triana, 2009). In so doing the firm signals to multiple stakeholders 
about the quality and reliability of its products and services (Frooman, 1999). In addition, 
by building a positive reputation, the firm is able to avoid signals o f opportunism, and 
present itself as a trustworthy business partner (Jones, 1995). After gaining a strong 
reputation, the firm can accrue a host of other benefits, such as better performance (Hall 
1992, 1993; Shamsie 2003), lower capital constraints (Cheng, Ioannou, & Serafeim,
2014) and increased attractiveness as a business partner (Dollinger et al., 1997).
Quality acquisition targets are normally more, not less successful than their 
industry peers (Graebner & Eisenhardt, 2004; Ravenscraft & Scherer, 1987; Walsh & 
Kosnik, 1993), which makes them very attractive to potential acquirers (Katila, 
Rosenberger, & Eisenhardt, 2008). All else equal, potential socially responsible acquirers 
may be perceived to be more appealing by prospective targets because involvement in 
CSR confers to a firm a degree of moral capital (Kane, 2001) by signaling to stakeholders 
that the firm is not entirely self-centered, hut c onsiders the impact o f its activities on 
various constituents (Godfrey et al., 2009). Moral capital has been attributed to attracting 
customers, improving productivity, and gaining investor support (Luo & Bhattacharya, 
2006), and can also be a form of insurance when the firm is faced with a negative event 
(Godfrey et al., 2009). Applying this logic in the M&A context, it could be argued that 
these CSR moral capital outcomes are not limited to customers and current constituents
with whom the firm does business. Prospective targets could also be among the audiences 
that observe the firm’s activities and make judgments out o f the signals portrayed by such 
activity. With prospective targets being largely more successful than their counterparts, it 
stands to reason that they would prefer to be acquired by successful firms that would 
likely assure benefits in the long term. The socially responsible acquirer would likely be 
viewed as the more attractive suitor since the established moral and reputational capital 
present it as the more trustworthy partner in the deal. In the same way that prospective 
job seekers (e.g., Rynes, 1991; Rynes & Miller, 1983), consumers, suppliers, and 
investors (Connelly et al., 2011) may use CSR information to form impressions about the 
firm, prospective targets may also use such information in assessing the acquirers. All 
else equal, a quality target may prefer to be acquired by a socially responsible firm as the 
acquired firm can gain immediate access to the acquirer’s reputational and moral capital 
benefits. Acquisition of such high quality targets is likely to lead to the attainment of 
synergies (Graebner & Eisenhardt, 2004), which could enhance post-acquisition 
performance.
In addition, in order to avoid the reputational costs that may stem from bad 
acquisitions, socially responsible acquirers are likely to perform more due diligence 
before making an acquisition. This is especially important because acquisitions that 
appear controversial to stakeholders may put the firm at risk of losing its current and 
potential members, as well as outside stakeholder endorsement and support (Lange & 
Washburn 2012). It is therefore important for the CSR firm to ensure that to external 
observers, it is not seen as implicitly or explicitly supporting socially irresponsible 
behavior through its operations [e.g. through its acquisitions] as the reputational costs
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may far outweigh other costs related to bad acquisitions (Karpoff, Lee, & Martin, 2008). 
The socially responsible acquirer is therefore likely to end up only acquiring high quality 
targets with clean track records, thereby minimizing the costs associated with bad 
acquisitions, which may ultimately lead to high post-acquisition performance. It is argued 
that the quality o f the target partially mediates the relationship between corporate social 
performance and post-acquisition performance.
Top management team (TMT) ownership positively affects the quality of a target 
firm because it causes the top managers’ wealth to vary directly with firm performance 
(Jensen & Murphy, 1990), thereby incentivizing the owner-managers to behave more like 
principals (Wang & Coffey, 1992). TMT ownership in the target firm boosts the level of 
influence that these managers will have on which acquiring firm wins the bid to acquire 
their firm. All else equal, the managers may evaluate the socially responsible acquirer as 
more desirable for the target, and will influence the board and key investors toward 
endorsing their preference to be acquired by a CSR firm. Conversely, low ownership 
concentration among the top managers causes them to be more susceptible to counsel and 
monitoring pressure from the board (Johnson, Hoskisson, & Hitt, 1993) and other key 
investors. In addition, TMTs with low ownership holdings may also be more likely to 
behave opportunistically (Dalton, Daily, Certo, & Roengpitya, 2003) as they would have 
an incentive to consume perquisites (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). This would ultimately 
reduce firm value (Berle & Means, 1933; Jensen & Meckling, 1976), and thereby lower 
the quality o f the target.
Family-controlled firms pay more attention to nonfinancial “socioemotional” 
aspects that meet the family’s affective needs (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007) than non-family
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firms. For a family target, socioemotional needs may include projecting and perpetuating 
a positive family image and reputation (Sharma & Manikutty, 2005; Westhead, Cowling, 
& Howorth, 2001), receiving recognition for generous actions (Schulze, Lubatkin, & 
Dino, 2003) and accumulation of social capital (Arregle, Hitt, Sirmon, & Very, 2007). 
Given that family firms have a tendency to place more value on social legitimacy for its 
own sake independent of financial considerations (Berrone, Cruz, Gomez-Mejia, & 
Larraza-Kintana, 2010), they are more likely to implement value enhancing practices and 
processes, thereby boosting their overall quality. Quality family targets are likely to be 
attracted to socially responsible acquirers because the mere acquisition by a CSR firm 
may boost the family’s image and reputation among key constituents, which appeals to 
the family’s socioemotional needs. For a socially responsible acquirer, the acquisition of 
a quality family firm would be desirable because the family target is likely to be pursuing 
goals that are more aligned with its own. This would likely lead to a synergistic 
combination (Graebner & Eisenhardt, 2004), consequently boosting post-acquisition 
performance.
Entrepreneurial firms are young, often small firms, with high growth potential 
(Baker & Aldrich, 2000). Founders o f such firms have a strong psychological attachment 
to their firms (Bruton, Fried, & Hisrich, 2000; Finkelstein & Boyd, 1998; Nelson, 2003), 
and are highly motivated to increase long-term value of their firms by ensuring that their 
firms are more innovative (Shefer & Frenkel, 2005). Given the efforts that the 
entrepreneurs take to ensure the success o f their ventures, an acquisition of firms in their 
entrepreneurial stage is therefore expected to be of higher quality. In addition, 
entrepreneurs would want their firm to be acquired by a reputable firm (Fombrun &
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Shanley, 1990) that promises continued future positive outcomes such as improved 
stakeholder relations and firm reputation (Hillman & Keim, 2001). For the 
entrepreneurial firm, an acquisition by a socially responsible firm may be more attractive 
because, on being acquired, the quality entrepreneurial target will enjoy these benefits ‘by 
extension’. An acquisition by a socially responsible firm may therefore assure the target’s 
owners that their firm is passing on to a ‘good firm’, which will likely perpetuate 
strategies that lead to the highest benefit for all stakeholders. Since the entrepreneurial 
firm may be more innovative compared to the more established CSR firm (Freeman & 
Soete, 1997; Powell & Brantley, 1992), access to the target’s innovative capacity may 
lead to higher post-acquisition performance, which may give the acquirer a competitive 
edge (Katila, Rosenberger, & Eisenhardt, 2008).
Data on CSR will be collected from the Kinder, Lydenberg, and Domini (KLD) 
database. KLD rates firms’ corporate social performance either as strengths or 
weaknesses (concerns), based on seven major areas: community, corporate governance, 
diversity, employee relations, environment, human rights, and product. This database has 
been widely utilized in many studies on CSR (e.g., McWilliams & Siegel, 2000; 
Neubaum & Zahra, 2006; Waddock & Graves, 1997). Acquisition data will be collected 
from the M&A module o f the Securities Data Corporation’s (SDC) database. Data on 
other key variables will be collected from Research Insight, while data on TMT 
ownership and TMT retention will be collected directly from the firm’s filings with the 
SEC. Any missing data, for example, ROA for a specific firm, will be obtained from 
S&P’s Capital IQ database. This database provides information on company profiles,
industry profiles, transaction profiles, and executive profiles (Phillips, 2012) on over 3.3 
million companies in more than 20 countries across the globe (CapitalIQ.com).
This paper makes a number o f contributions. First, it contributes to the acquisition 
performance literature (e.g., Cannella & Hambrick, 1993; Graebner, 2004) by indicating 
that CSR is one of the determinants o f acquisition performance. Relatedly, it contributes 
to CSR literature by showing that CSR may influence acquisition performance in ways 
that prior studies have not examined. The paper also furthers our understanding as to why 
some types of companies are acquired by some other types o f companies, and the motives 









































2.1 Acquisitions and Organizational Performance
An acquisition can be very beneficial as a value-enhancing tool, both for the 
acquirer and the target. An acquirer can reap benefits such as achieving strategic renewal 
(Graebner, Eisenhardt, & Roundy, 2010), obtaining specific products or technologies that 
are owned, or are under development by the target firm (Birkinshaw, Bresman, & 
Hakanson, 2000; Graebner, 2004; Ranft & Lord, 2000), and gaining access to capabilities 
that are embedded in the knowledge of individuals and teams within the acquired firm 
(Ranft & Lord, 2000; Schweizer, 2005). Targets on the other hand can increase their 
strategic resource portfolio (Graebner & Eisenhardt, 2004; Inkpen, Sundaram, & 
Rockwood, 2000) and reap financial gains (Datta, Pinches, & Narayanan, 1992) from an 
acquisition. An acquisition can also relieve personal pressures resulting from ownership 
(Graebner & Eisenhardt, 2004).
Aside from the above mentioned objectives, one overarching goal for both sellers 
and buyers is the achievement of synergy (Graebner & Eisenhardt, 2004). However, 
within the M&A literature, particular interest surrounds the finding that the anticipated 
synergies mostly remain unrealized, leading to poor post-acquisition performance (Datta, 
Pinches, & Narayanan, 1992; King, Dalton, Daily, & Covin, 2004). Some authors have
11
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argued that the decrease m the acquirer’s performance could be attributed to suboptimal 
initial integration efforts (Barkema & Schijven, 2008), loss of autonomy (Chatterjee, 
Lubatkin, Schweiger, & Weber, 1992; Very & Lubatkin, 1997), lower post-acquisition 
R&D investments (Hitt, Hoskisson, Ireland, & Harrison, 1991), incompatibility of 
acquirer and target firm cultures (Very, Lubatkin, Calori & Veiga, 1997), bidder-to-target 
dissimilarity in product offerings and geographic reach (Ellis, Reus, Lamont, & Ranft,
2011), and hubristic CEOs’ overestimation of their own capacity to create value when 
buying targets (Roll, 1986). Authors suggest that, in order to overcome these problems 
and achieve superior post-acquisition outcomes, firms should seek acquisitions that offer 
a better strategic fit in the form of resource similarity or complementarity (Barkema & 
Schijven, 2008; Harrison, Hitt, Hoskisson, & Ireland, 1991; Kusewitt, 1985; Lubatkin, 
1987; Pennings, Barkema, & Douma, 1994; Ramaswamy, 1997; Shelton, 1988; Singh & 
Montgomery, 1987). In addition, from a corporate governance perspective, Kroll, 
Walters, and Wright (2008) suggest that vigilant boards rich in appropriate experience 
could help achieve superior performance.
2.2 CSR and Organizational Performance
A plethora of studies have examined the relationship between CSR and corporate 
performance and have arrived at varying conclusions. For example, some have found the 
relationship to be positive (e.g., Lev, Petrovits, & Radhakrishnan, 2010; Wang & Qian, 
2011; Waddock & Graves, 1997a), negative (e.g., Julian & Ofori-dankwa, 2013), neutral 
(e.g., McWilliams & Siegel, 2000), and U shaped (Barnett & Salomon, 2012; Wang, 
Choi, & Li, 2008; Brammer & Millington, 2008). Despite the mixed findings, research
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suggests that involvement with CSR can improve stakeholder relations (McWilliams & 
Siegel, 2001) and elicit positive stakeholder relations for the firm (Bamett, 2007).
Apart from studies on the relationship between CSR and financial outcomes of the 
firm, CSR engagement has also been attributed to positive security analysts’ assessments 
(Ioannou & Serafeim, 2015; Luo, Wang, Raithel, & Zheng, 2015), favorable job seekers’ 
perceptions o f the firm (Jones, Willness, & Madey, 2014), lower cost of capital 
(Sharfman & Fernando, 2008) and lower capital constraints (Cheng, Ioannou, &
Serafeim, 2014). Some authors have also concluded that CSR provides ‘insurance-like’ 
benefits against negative environmental events that threaten firm value (Godfrey, Merrill, 
& Hansen, 2009; McGuire, Sundgren, & Schneeweis, 1988) and against litigation risk 
(Koh, Qian, & Wang, 2014). Scholars looking at proactive environmental performance 
by firms have also found that such strategies are associated with the emergence o f unique 
organizational capabilities, which consequently impact firm competitiveness (Sharma, & 
Vredenburg, 1998), and that such proactive firms have a deeper and broader coverage of 
stakeholder demands (Buysse & Verbeke, 2003). A primary objective behind CSR 
activities by firms is the ability to build good relationships (Clarkson, 1995), and later, 
utilize these relationships to invoke favorable evaluations from key stakeholder groups 
(Bamett, 2007; Wang & Qian, 2011). The positive evaluations are especially important 
where individual consumers are the predominant customers (Lev, Petrovits, & 
Radhakrishnan, 2010) and when the firm in question is highly visible to various 
stakeholders (Chiu & Sharfman, 2011).
Corporate social performance weaknesses, on the other hand, have been found to 
have detrimental effects on performance (e.g., Jayachandran, Kalaignanam, & Eilert,
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2013). Muller and Kraussl (2011) found that firms that were reputed for social 
irresponsibility were associated with the greatest drop in stock prices subsequent to a 
negative environmental effect, which in their case was hurricane Katrina. In addition, 
Ramchander, Schwebach, and Staking (2012) also document negative stock price 
responses subsequent to deletion from a social performance index. Socially irresponsible 
actions can also act as “ammunition for adversaries” (Elsbach & Sutton, 1992: 712) when 
competitors use such actions to their advantage. In sum, socially irresponsible and illegal 
corporate activities considerably decrease shareholder wealth (Frooman, 1997). From an 
attribution theory perspective, Lange and Washburn (2012) suggest that perceptions of 
social irresponsibility have a greater capability to provoke reactions from stakeholders as 
compared to socially responsible actions. Walters, and Wright (2008) suggest that 
vigilant boards rich in appropriate experience could help achieve superior performance.
2.3 Stakeholder Theory
Stakeholder theorists suggest that a business can be understood as a set of 
relationships among groups that have a stake in the activities that make up the business 
(Freeman, 1984; Jones, 1995; Walsh, 2005). They assert that superior organizational 
outcomes result from effective management o f the various relationships the firm has with 
its stakeholders (Bamett & Salomon, 2012; Freeman, 1984; Ramchander, Schwebach, & 
Staking, 2012).
The stakeholder theory was introduced by Freeman (1984) in his book, Strategic 
Management: A Stakeholder Approach. Freeman (1984) suggests that stakeholders 
provide [either tangible or intangible] resources that are critical to the firm's long-term 
success. For example, stockholders provide capital; suppliers provide inputs and
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knowledge; employees offer their skills and expertise; customers provide good positive 
word-of-mouth; and the media assists in perpetuating a favorable corporate image 
(Maignan, Ferrell, & Ferrell, 2005). The ability o f stakeholders to withdraw or threaten to 
withdraw needed resources gives them power over the organization (Maignan & Ferrell, 
2004), hence the need for stakeholder attention.
In their seminal article, Donaldson and Preston (1995) proposed that three 
formulations underlie the exploration of stakeholder theory. These are 
descriptive/empirical, instrumental, and normative. Descriptive/empirical formulations of 
stakeholder theory are meant to describe, and sometimes to explain, specific corporate or 
management characteristics and their behaviors (Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Jones, 
1995). Descriptive/empirical theories address the question, what happens? (Jones, 1995). 
Descriptive formulations help to explain the past, present, and future aspects regarding 
corporations, and are important in the exploration of new ideas and in the generation of 
explanatory and predictive propositions (Donaldson & Preston, 1995).
Instrumental formulations of stakeholder theory are used to identify the existence 
or non-existence of relationships between stakeholder management and the attainment of 
defined corporate objectives, for example, profitability or growth (Donaldson & Preston, 
1995). Scholars argue that fair treatment o f important stakeholders motivates those 
stakeholders to reciprocate, and in effect, create value for the firm (Bosse, Phillips, & 
Harrison, 2009; Bridoux & Stoelhorst, 2014; Harrison, Bosse, & Phillips 2010; Hillman 
& Keim, 2001). Instrumental theory associates "means" to "ends" and may suggest that 
certain outcomes (e.g., corporate performance) would be more likely i f  firms or their 
managers strategically manage their stakeholders (Jawahar & McLaughlin, 2001).
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Scholars basing their arguments on the instrumental perspective tend to come up 
with conclusions that imply that the observance of certain stakeholder principles may 
lead to the achievement of corporate performance objectives (Donaldson & Preston,
1995). Jones (1995) suggests that the instrumental stakeholder perspective views the firm 
as a "nexus of contracts" (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) between itself and its stakeholders. 
The firm is said to gain a competitive advantage when it minimizes its contracting costs 
(Bamett & Salomon, 2012) through the development of mutual trust and cooperation 
with its stakeholders (Jones, 1995; Wicks, Berman, & Jones, 1999). Instrumental theories 
address the question, what happens if? (Jones, 1995).
The normative perspective concerns the moral propriety o f the behavior o f firms 
and/or their managers (Jones, 1995). This perspective is important in understanding the 
philosophical guidelines for the operation and management of corporations (Donaldson & 
Preston, 1995). Scholars basing their arguments on the normative formulation suggest 
how various stakeholders ought to be treated by the firm or its management, based on 
some underlying moral or philosophical principles (Collins & Porras, 1994; Freeman, 
1994; Jawahar & McLaughlin, 2001; Paine, 1994). Donaldson and Preston (1995) 
suggest that the normative formulation is the most important to stakeholder theory. 
Normative theories address the question, what should happen? (Jones, 1995).
Donaldson and Preston (1995) proposed that the three formulations o f the 
stakeholder theory are nested within each other. The outer shell represents the 
descriptive formulation, whereby relationships that are observed in the external world are 
presented and explained. The second level represents the instrumental and predictive 
value of the theory. Represented here are arguments that, if  X is done, then outcome Y is
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to be expected. The core of the theory is normative, whereby the descriptive accuracy of 
the theory is assumed to emanate from its normative beginnings. “Recognizing the 
ultimate moral values and obligations gives stakeholder management its fundamental 
normative base” (Donaldson & Preston, 1995: 74).
Stakeholder theory has provided a basis for the study o f a wide array of 
organizational phenomena including corporate governance (e.g., Adams, Licht, & Sagiv, 
2011), fairness and reciprocity (e.g., Bosse et al., 2009; Bridoux & Stoelhorst, 2014; 
Tangpong, Li, & Johns, 2010), stakeholder management (e.g., Berman et al., 1999), 
strategic cognition (e.g., Bundy, Shropshire, & Buchholtz, 2013; Crilly & Sloan, 2012), 
organizational irresponsibility (e.g., Pfarrer, Decelles, Smith, & Taylor, 2008; Bamett,
2014), and corporate social responsibility (e.g., Bamett & Salomon, 2006; Bamett & 
Salomon, 2012; Flammer, 2012; Kassinis & Vafeas, 2002; Kang, 2013; Koh, Qian, & 
Wang, 2014; Neubaum & Zahra, 2006; Wang & Qian, 2011) among others. In their 
investigation of how personal (e.g., values) and contextual (e.g., professional role) factors 
may affect board members’ attitudes and decisions, Adams et al. (2011) find support for 
the existence of shareholderism as a general orientation of siding with shareholders in 
different situations.
Berman et al. (1999) investigate stakeholder management in light o f two models,
(1) the strategic stakeholder management model (whereby stakeholder attention is driven 
by the perceived ability of such concern to improve firm financial performance), and (2) 
the intrinsic stakeholder commitment model (whereby firms are viewed as having a moral 
commitment to treat stakeholders fairly, which subsequently influences financial
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performance). Their results lend support for the strategic stakeholder management model 
but no support for the intrinsic stakeholder commitment model.
Bosse et al. (2009) argue that people are not purely self-interested, but rather, tend 
to reciprocate fair treatment and are willing to incur costs to punish perceived unfair 
treatment. They argue that such reciprocity extends to all stakeholders of the firm and 
that it also affects firm performance. Harrison et al. (2010) support this perspective by 
suggesting that under conditions of reciprocity, stakeholders would be more willing to 
share information on their utility functions, thus better enabling the firm to serve them. 
Bridoux and Stoelhorst (2014) on the other hand relax the presumption that all 
stakeholders care about fairness, and argue that potential stakeholders include 
‘reciprocators,’ who value fairness, and also self-regarding stakeholders, who do not.
They maintain that a fairness tactic would work better for attracting, retaining, and 
motivating reciprocal stakeholders to create value, while an arms-length approach would 
work better for attracting and motivating self-regarding stakeholders. Tangpong et al.
(2010) investigate whether stakeholder management without reciprocity between the firm 
and its stakeholders can effect stakeholder-related decisions. They conclude that the 
stakeholder prescription increases the possibility that managers will make decisions in the 
employees’ favor, but is not sufficient to significantly increase the chances that the 
managers will reach decisions in favor o f customers and suppliers.
From a strategic cognition perspective, Bundy et al. (2013) suggest that firms will 
respond to stakeholder concerns based on (1) an expressive logic, which relates to 
organizational identity and guides issues around the firm’s conceptions o f the self, and
(2) an instrumental logic, which relates to a firm’s strategic interpretations of issues
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founded on the rational pursuit of organizational goals. They propose that firms respond 
more substantially to those issues perceived as salient to the two cognitive logics above, 
and more symbolically to those issues perceived as salient to only one logic. Crilly and 
Sloan (2012) also examine the effect of managerial cognition on corporate attention to 
stakeholders and conclude that that the top managers’ framing o f the organization’s 
relationships with society induces distinct foci of attention and possibly constrains how 
well the organization attends to its various stakeholders.
2.3.1 Stakeholder Theory and Corporate Social Performance
The classical perspective of the firm proposed by Friedman (1970) postulates that 
the firm should only be concerned with maximizing economic returns to the owners. 
However, subsequent advances in research and practice have led to the conclusion that 
management of the diverse set o f stakeholders (Freeman, 1984) is positively related to 
shareholder value creation (Hillman & Keim, 2001). Stakeholder theory has been 
invoked while investigating CSR in the light of a variety of topics including the CSR- 
CFP relationship (Bamett & Salomon, 2006; Bamett & Salomon, 2012; Brammer & 
Millington, 2008; Wang & Qian, 2011), shareholder value creation (Hillman & Keim, 
2001), diversification (Kang, 2013), litigation risk (Kassinis & Vafeas, 2002; Koh, Qian, 
& Wang, 2014), decision-making (Agle, Mitchell, & Sonnenfeld, 1999; Henriques & 
Sadorsky,1999; Stevens, Steensma, Harrison, & Cochran, 2005; Wong, Ormiston, & 
Tetlock, 2011), and corporate governance (Deckop, Merriman, & Gupta, 2006).
Barnett’s (2007) stakeholder influence capacity (SIC) concept, defined as “the 
ability of a firm to identify, act on, and profit from opportunities to improve stakeholder 
relationships through CSR” (2007: 803), maintains that, by participating in CSR
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activities, firms will be perceived as being more credible and will be rewarded by their 
stakeholders (Bamett, 2007; Bamett & Salomon, 2012). The said rewards may come in 
the form of lower transaction costs (Williamson, 1975), access to information that may 
lead to greater efficiency and innovation (Harrison et al., 2010), and the enhancement of 
future wealth-creation capacity (Fama, 1970; Graves & Waddock, 1994). Similarly, some 
have also argued that engagement in CSR activity positively impacts financial 
performance by enabling firms to elicit better stakeholder responses and gain required 
resources (e.g., Wang & Qian, 2011; Waddock & Graves, 1997).
CSR yields strategic benefits for organizations by boosting their positions within 
their institutional contexts, e.g. their industry/market (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Some 
have also argued that CSR aids in the creation of intangible assets (Fombmn, 1996; 
Fombrun, Gardberg, & Bamett, 2000; Godfrey, 2005; Porter & Kramer, 2002). These 
authors maintain that CSR activities are investments comparable to R&D and advertising, 
since they create intangible assets for companies that help them to overcome nationalistic 
barriers, facilitate globalization, and build local advantage (Gardberg & Fombmn, 2006). 
Additionally, CSR activities also act as a source of reputational capital, which boosts the 
firm’s attractiveness to prospective customers, employees and business partners (Fischer 
& Reuber, 2007; Fombmn, 2001; Fombmn & Shanley, 1990; Jones, 1995; Puncheva,
2008). Through CSR, firms are able to bolster various stakeholder relations (McWilliams 
& Siegel, 2001), thereby creating trusting, cooperative firm-stakeholder relationships 
(Jones, 1995), which may also be important in the formation of profitable alliances, long­
term contracts and joint ventures (Barringer & Harrison, 2000; Harrison & St. John,
1996).
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Bamett & Salomon (2012) employ the stakeholder perspective in their 
investigation of the CSP-CFP relationship, and conclude that the relationship is U- 
shaped. They find that firms with low CSP have higher CFP compared to firms with 
moderate CSP, but firms with high CSP have the highest CFP. Similarly, Bamett and 
Salomon (2006) find that as the number of social screens used by socially responsible 
mutual fund increases, financial performance declines at first, but then rebounds as the 
number of screens reaches a maximum. Brammer and Millington (2008) also find that 
firms with both unusually high and low CSP have higher financial performance than 
other firms. Their findings indicate that unusually poor social performers do best in the 
short ran and unusually good social performers do best in the long run. Wang and Qian
(2011) on the other hand investigate CSP in the Chinese context and conclude that CSP 
boosts financial performance by bringing about better stakeholder responses and enabling 
firms to gain political resources. Hillman & Keim’s (2001) study finds that although 
stakeholder management may lead to shareholder wealth creation, involvement in social 
issues may not lead to shareholder wealth creation.
Kang (2013) investigates diversification and CSR from the stakeholder 
perspective and comes to the conclusion that the level of diversification is positively 
related to firm CSP. Kang’s (2013) findings also support the notion that a strong focus on 
short-term profit by diversified firms may suppress its responses to stakeholder demands 
and investment in social issues. Similarly, Deckop et al. (2006) conclude that a short-term 
CEO pay focus is negatively related to CSP, while a longer-term focus is positively 
related to CSP.
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Mitchell, Agle, and Wood (1997) propose that in order for managers to recognize 
a stakeholder group and establish its level o f importance to the corporation, such a group 
would have to possess the following: power to influence the firm, a legitimate 
relationship with the firm, and an urgent claim on the firm. In concurrence with this 
assertion, Agle et al. (1999) investigate stakeholder salience for CEOs and find that the 
stakeholder attributes o f power, legitimacy, and urgency are independently and in totality 
related to stakeholder salience, meaning these stakeholder attributes influence the way 
top managers rank competing stakeholders and their interests. Supporting this finding, 
Stevens et al. (2005) report that financial executives would more likely incorporate the 
firm’s ethics code into their strategic decision-making in two situations: first, when there 
are pressures from market stakeholders, and second, if the use o f  ethics codes builds an 
ethical culture and propagates a positive external image for the firms. Henriques and 
Sadorsky (1999) find that firms that are highly committed to environmental issues differ 
from less environmentally committed firms in their perceptions o f the relative importance 
of different stakeholders.
Finally, more decentralized firms show higher levels o f CSP than their more 
centralized counterparts (Wong et al., 2011). Wong et al. (2011) further support the 
notion that firms having TMTs with higher integrative complexity exhibit higher CSP as 
opposed to firms with TMTs with lower levels of integrative complexity. A summary of 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In addition to the aforementioned CSR outcomes, various scholarly findings 
support the existence of other positive outcomes from CSR engagement. With regard to 
customer related outcomes, Brown and Dacin (1997) find that consumers’ cognitive 
associations of a firm’s CSR seem to wield some influence on product evaluations. 
Relatedly, Sen and Bhattacharya (2001) conclude that non-engagement in CSR can, in 
some cases, diminish consumers' intentions to purchase a company's products. 
Associations of products with charity, however, may improve the quality assessment for 
brands that customers may know little about (Arora & Henderson, 2007) and may lead to 
increased customer loyalty (Maignan, Ferrell, & Hult, 1999).
Corporate social performance has also been posited to generate moral capital 
among the firms’ stakeholders, which may generate insurance-like benefits for the firm, 
thereby acting as an intangible asset (Godfrey, 2005). The legitimacy conferred by CSR 
may also help the firm to incur less unsystematic stock market risk as compared to 
illegitimate firms (Bansal & Clelland, 2004). Orlitzky and Benjamin (2001) find that 
CSR initiatives are associated with financial risk for firms, and that CSP is more strongly 
correlated with measures of market risk than measures of accounting risk. Investors have 
also been found to respond favorably to CSR initiatives (e.g., Graves & Waddock, 1994; 
Coffey & Fryxell, 1991).
CSR activities have also been associated with a number of positive human 
resource outcomes for firms. For example, CSR initiatives provide a competitive 
advantage in attracting job seekers and fostering optimistic career success expectations 
(Backhaus, Stone, & Heiner, 2002; Lin, Tsai, Joe, & Chiu, 2012; Turban & Greening,
1997). Such initiatives can boost firm image and reputation and as a result attract a higher
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quality and quantity of workers (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990, Waddock & Graves, 1997). 
The underlying argument here is that CSP activity may act as a signal to various 
constituents regarding firms' reputation and legitimacy (Johnson & Greening, 1999). CSR 
thus portrays the organization as possessing values and norms that are important to many 
prospective and current workers, signaling more favorable working conditions as 
opposed to their low CSP counterparts (Greening & Turban, 2000). Others (e.g., Carmeli, 
Gilat, & Waldman, 2007) document that perceived social responsibility is related to 
greater organizational identification. Relatedly, CSR has been linked to higher quality 
employee connections and creative involvement with their firms (Glavas & Piderit,
2009), organizational citizenship behavior (Jones, 2010; Lin, Lyau, Tsai, Chen, & Chiu,
2010), higher employee retention (Jones, 2010), higher quality employee engagement 
(Glavas & Piderit, 2009), and improvements in employee commitment (Maignan et al., 
1999). All these outcomes are ultimately related to better business performance (Maignan 
et al., 1999) and a higher competitive advantage (Greening & Turban, 2000).
2.4 Signaling Theory
Signaling theory explains the process utilized by decision makers in situations of 
information asymmetry (Spence, 1973). At its core, signaling theory relates to the 
reduction o f information asymmetry between two parties (Spence, 2002). Signals are 
"those observable characteristics attached to the individual that are subject to 
manipulation by him" (Spence, 1973: 357). Signals allow economic actors to 
communicate that they are qualitatively different from other actors (Sanders & Boivie, 
2004). For signaling to occur, the signaler ought to gain through some action from the
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receiver that the receiver would not otherwise have performed, usually by selecting the 
signaler in favor o f some alternatives (Connelly, Certo, Ireland, & Reutzel, 2011).
Spence (1973) utilized the theory to explain the signaling role o f education. He 
modeled the labor market in a signaling context in which prospective employers are faced 
with information asymmetry in differentiating between high quality and low quality 
candidates. In order to distinguish themselves from the low quality candidates, the higher 
quality individuals set themselves apart by enduring the rigors of costly higher education. 
Education therefore serves as a signal of quality as it shows their capacity to endure the 
intellectual rigor o f higher education. Signaling theory therefore differs from the human 
capital theory in the fact that, while human capital theory supports the notion that 
education increases worker productivity, signaling theory places an emphasis on 
education as a channel to convey otherwise unobservable characteristics o f the job 
candidate (Connelly et al., 2011; Weiss, 1995).
A typical illustration of the signaling model is presented by Kirmani and Rao 
(2000) in which firms are characterized as being either high quality or low quality. For 
these firms, the authors argue that information asymmetry exists because while the firms 
are aware of their true quality, outsiders and other external stakeholders are not. The 
firms therefore have a chance to signal their true quality to their audiences. The different 
payoffs presented by the authors are outlined in Table 2-2.
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Table 2-2: Summary signaling matrix.
With Signaling With No Signaling
High quality firms A B
Low quality firms C D
Signaling would be would be worthwhile if  signaling benefits are greater than any 
benefits from any other alternative strategy (A > B) for the high-quality firms, and non­
signaling is more beneficial than signaling (D > C) for the low quality firm. When in 
concurrent occurrence, these two conditions bring about a ‘separating equilibrium’. As 
either type of firm pursues its most profitable strategy, the signaling firm is naturally 
perceived to be of higher quality than the non-signaler. In so doing, the higher quality 
firm may utilize signaling as an impression management tool (Kraatz & Love, 2006) by 
transmitting key attributes o f the firm that provide information aimed at influencing the 
impressions that individuals form of the organization (Jones & Murrell, 2001).
Signaling theory has been implemented in the investigation of an array of 
organizational phenomena. In the organizational behavior and human resources literature, 
authors argue that since job seekers may have incomplete information about a firm, they 
may rely o f the information they obtain as a signal about the working conditions at a firm 
(Breaugh, 1992; Rynes, 1991). In particular, discretionary actions that increase 
perceptions o f organizational support may be interpreted by employees to mean that they 
are valued by the organization (Eisenberger, Huntington, Hutchison, & Sowa, 1986; 
Turban & Greening, 1997; Wayne, Grzywacz, Carlson, & Kacmar, 1997).
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In strategic management, corporate governance research has particularly benefited 
from signaling theory. In their study of top management teams, Zhang and Wiersema 
(2009) argue that CEOs may use the observable financial statement quality to signal the 
unobservable quality of their firms. Signaling theory has also been utilized to assess the 
role of top management team characteristics in communicating firm quality in the initial 
public offering (IPO) context (e.g., Certo, Daily, & Dalton, 2001; Cohen & Dean, 2005; 
Higgins & Gulati, 2003,2006). Certo (2003) argues that strong executive characteristics 
convey a signal of quality to external parties. In the same vein, Pollock and Gulati (2007) 
have argued that signaling can increase IPO firm visibility to analysts, investors, and the 
media and can also be utilized to gain "strategic legitimacy" (Higgins & Gulati, 2006).
Signaling has also been extensively used in board research. For example, some 
posit that firms may signal their unobservable quality by having boards with prestigious 
board members (Certo, 2003; Deutsch & Ross, 2003; Lester, Certo, Dalton, Dalton, & 
Cannella, 2006), and may also signal their adherence to social laws and ability to 
understand diverse stakeholders by having diverse boards (Miller & Triana, 2009).
Others have also investigated the signaling role of ownership. For example, it has been 
argued that since managers have access to ‘insider information’, firms may utilize insider 
ownership to signal firm quality (Filatotchev & Bishop, 2002; Sanders & Boivie, 2004). 
Managers o f high quality firms may therefore signal firm quality by holding large equity 
stakes (Connelly et al., 2010). Other types of signals include CEO financial statement 
certification as a signal o f financial statement quality (Zhang & Wiersema, 2009), and the 
capability o f prompt interest and dividend payments as a signal o f firm quality 
(Bhattacharya, 1979; Ross, 1973).
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2.4.1 CSR and Signaling in Mergers and Acquisitions
Studies suggest that as a result of the existence of information asymmetry, the 
public frequently relies on actions and symbols to judge a firm’s reputation and quality 
(Ferrier, 1997; Fombrun & Shanley, 1990; Miller & Triana, 2009; Spence, 1973). Firms 
use these actions to avail information to the public, which eventually influences the 
public’s judgment on the firm (Ferrier, 1997; Mahon, 2002). CSR activities are primarily 
meant to build reputation and status for the firm among the public (Miller & Triana,
2009). In so doing the firm signals to multiple stakeholders about the quality and 
reliability of its products and services (Frooman, 1999). In addition, by building a 
positive reputation, the firm is able to avoid signals o f opportunism, thereby presenting 
itself as a trustworthy business partner (Jones, 1995). After gaining a strong reputation, 
the firm can accrue a host of other benefits, such as performance advantages (Hall 1992, 
1993; Shamsie 2003), lower capital constraints (Cheng et al., 2014), and increased 
attractiveness as a business partner (Dollinger et al., 1997). As such, CSR enables a firm 
to communicate its distinctiveness in terms of how it values various social issues in 
comparison to other firms within its competitive environment (Benabou & Tirole, 2010; 
Jones & Murrell, 2001).
CSR especially confers to a firm a degree o f moral capital (Kane, 2001) by 
signaling to stakeholders that the firm is not entirely self-centered, but considers the 
impact of its activities on various constituents (Godfrey et al., 2009). Moral capital has 
been attributed to attracting customers, improving productivity, and gaining investor 
support (Luo & Bhattacharya, 2006), and can also be a form of insurance when the firm 
is faced with a negative event (Godfrey et al., 2009). Applying this logic in the M&A
36
context, it could be argued that these CSR moral capital outcomes are not limited to 
customers and current constituents with whom the firm does business. Prospective targets 
could also be among the audiences that observe the firm’s activities and make judgments 
out of the signals portrayed by such activity. With prospective targets being largely more 
successful than their counterparts, it stands to reason that they would prefer to be 
acquired by successful firms that would likely assure benefits in the long term. The CSR 
acquirer would likely be viewed as the more attractive suitor since the established moral 
and reputational capital present it as the more trustworthy partner in the deal. In the same 
way that prospective job seekers (e.g., Rynes, 1991; Rynes & Miller, 1983), consumers, 
suppliers, and investors (Connelly et al., 2011) may use CSR information to form 
impressions about the firm, prospective targets may also use such information in 
assessing the acquirers. All else equal, a quality target may prefer to be acquired by a 
socially responsible firm as the acquired firm can gain immediate access to the acquirer’s 
reputational and moral capital benefits. Acquisition of such high quality targets is likely 
to lead to the attainment o f synergies (Graebner & Eisenhardt, 2004), which could 
enhance post-acquisition performance.
Jayachandran et al. (2013) argue that socially responsible activities are aimed at 
eliciting ‘unspecified reciprocity’ from stakeholders that can possibly affect an 
organization’s ability to thrive within its niche. For the acquirer, CSR engagement may 
be used as a tool to elicit positive trust evaluations from current and prospective 
stakeholders. For a quality target intent on maintaining some key impressions and 
relationships with its stakeholders, a socially responsible acquirer may be more attractive 
because through its CSR activity, stakeholder support is likely to be maintained. In
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addition, such activity may provide insurance-like benefits against negative events 
(Godfrey et al., 2009; McGuire et al., 1988) and against litigation risk (Koh et al., 2014). 
As such, CSP enables a firm to communicate its distinctiveness in terms o f how it values 
various social issues in comparison to other firms within its competitive environment 
(Benabou & Tirole, 2010; Jones & Murrell, 2001).
2.5 Hypothesis Development
2.5.1 Acquirer CSR and Post-Acquisition Performance
Managerial interpretations of CSR issues as opportunities rather than threats can 
influence an organization’s CSR strategy (Sharma, Pablo, & Vredenburg, 1999). The 
greater the extent to which managers perceive environmental and social concerns as 
central to their company's identity, the greater the likelihood that they will interpret these 
issues as opportunities rather than as threats (Sharma, 2000). Acquirers that hold CSR at 
the core of their corporate identity are likely to be actively engaged in CSR. As a result, 
these firms are likely to have excellent reputations which appeal to prospective business 
partners, employees and customers (Fischer & Reuber, 2007; Fombrun, 2001; Fombrun 
& Shanley, 1990; Jones, 1995; Puncheva, 2008). Given that focal quality acquisition 
targets are normally more, not less successful than their industry peers (Ravenscraft & 
Scherer, 1987; Walsh & Kosnik, 1993), these targets may also be attractive to other 
prospective acquirers (Katila et al., 2008). All else equal, the CSR firm’s continued 
engagement in CSR would have enabled it to build an excellent reputation over time, 
which may also have translated to excellent financial performance (Waddock & Graves, 
1997; Wang & Qian, 2011). Compared to another acquirer that does not have a CSR 
strategy in place, the CSR firm would be appealing to prospective quality targets because
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an acquisition by the firm may come with an implied promise o f longer-term benefits in 
the form of attracting good business partners, employees, and customers (Fischer & 
Reuber, 2007; Fombrun, 2001; Fombrun & Shanley, 1990; Jones, 1995; Puncheva,
2008). In addition, the favorable reputational capital of the socially responsible acquirer 
would present the firm as a trustworthy partner (Jones, 1995) and would avail some 
advantage when bidding against other non-CSR companies for a specific quality target. 
With the quality target’s prior excellent track record of good performance, the CSR 
acquirer may be able to derive synergies from the acquisition that would ultimately lead 
to greater acquisition performance.
To potential quality targets intent on being acquired by a reputable, trustworthy 
firm (Jones, 1995), the socially responsible firm would likely seem to be a good bet. This 
would be advantageous to the socially responsible acquirer, since it would likely have 
many prospective targets seeking to be bought by it. The socially responsible firm would 
therefore have a wider pool o f potential targets to choose from, giving it a higher 
likelihood o f choosing a target with the highest potential for assuring the best future 
performance.
Organizational actions by the socially responsible firm that appear controversial 
to stakeholders may put the firm at risk o f losing current and potential members, as well 
as outside endorsement and support (Lange & Washburn, 2012). It is therefore important 
for the CSR firm to ensure that to external observers, it is not seen as implicitly or 
explicitly supporting socially irresponsible behavior through its operations. In their study 
of 585 firms targeted by the SEC for financial misrepresentations from 1978 to 2002, 
Karpoff et al. (2008) concluded that while legal actions led to penalties o f around $24
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million, reputational costs were more than seven times higher. For the socially 
responsible acquirer, the best outcome would be to complete an acquisition that would 
lead to a synergistic combination (Graebner & Eisenhardt, 2004) with no resultant costs, 
reputational or otherwise. The acquirer will likely do better due diligence in order to 
ensure that the target firm it is about to acquire is not currently involved in, or has not 
previously been involved in activities that could damage the acquirer’s reputation.
From the foregoing discussion we can conclude that reputational gains from 
corporate social performance will be favorably received by prospective quality targets. 
From an attribution theory perspective, the prospective quality targets are likely to 
evaluate the focal socially responsible firm more favorably and are likely to prefer to be 
acquired by it. Therefore, the socially responsible firms will likely tend to acquire high 
quality targets, which would lead to higher post-acquisition performance. In line with the 
foregoing argument above, I also argue that in the presence o f a quality target, the 
relationship between corporate social performance and acquisition performance will be 
stronger. Given that the relationship is expected to remain significant, I propose a partial 
mediation hypothesis. This argument leads to the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis one. The acquirer's corporate social performance is positively related 
to its acquisition performance.
Hypothesis two. The quality of the target mediates the relationship between CSR 
and acquisition performance.
2.5.2 The Moderating Effect o f TMT Ownership
Many researchers have found support for the notion that ownership structures 
influence corporate decision making and the outcomes thereof (e.g., Baysinger, Kosnik,
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& Turk, 1991; Kochhar & David, 1996). Specifically, they maintain that TMT ownership 
positively affects corporate performance (e.g., McConnell & Servaes, 1990; Morck et al., 
1988) through, for example, encouraging higher R&D spending (e.g., Hill & Snell, 1988, 
1989; Francis & Smith, 1995), corporate attention to stakeholders (Zahra, Oviatt, & 
Minyard, 1993; Johnson & Greening, 1999), corporate entrepreneurship (Zahra, 1996), 
attention to product quality and innovation (Hansen & Hill, 1991), and managerial 
responses to changing environments (Finkelstein, 1992). These positive outcomes have 
been attributed to the fact that substantial ownership in the firm may represent a 
significant part o f the executives’ personal wealth, thereby incentivizing the managers to 
work harder to increase the value of the firm (Morck et al., 1988). In addition, since high 
levels of ownership cause the top managers’ wealth to vary directly with firm 
performance (Jensen & Murphy, 1990), managers will be more motivated to undertake 
value-maximizing behavior (e.g., Amihud & Lev, 1981; Davis, 1991; Denis, Denis, & 
Sarin, 1997; Gedajlovic & Shapiro, 2002; Morck et al., 1988).
High ownership stakes endow managers with a higher degree of power to 
influence the future of the firm as the top managers can propose and vote on key strategic 
decisions (Finkelstein, 1992; Oh, Chang, & Martynov, 2011). Higher ownership also 
gives managers a higher degree o f leverage in the selection of directors that would more 
likely endorse the managers’ decisions (Zajac & Westphal, 1996). Similarly, the CEO 
allegiance hypothesis (Byrd, Cooperman, & Wolfe, 2010) suggests that directors may 
shift their allegiance from shareholders to powerful executives out of a desire to maintain 
their jobs, and are therefore less likely to oppose key decisions by the executives. Indeed, 
top manager ownership proportion has often been used as a proxy for managerial power
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(e.g., Finkelstein, 1992; McEachem, 1975) and for the degree o f incentive for insiders to 
protect the firm’s interests (Kassinis & Yafeas, 2002).
All else equal, top managers of the quality target will likely be attracted to an 
acquisition by a socially responsible acquirer, since such a firm would ensure longer-term 
stakeholder support (Johnson & Greening, 1999) which, in turn, would maximize the 
long-term value of their firm. Since the managers are likely to have been heavily 
involved in getting the target firm to its current high levels of performance, they may be 
heavily emotionally invested in the firm, and will also have the interests o f the 
organization at heart. An acquisition by a socially responsible firm may be viewed as an 
attractive strategic move because it would avail resources and technologies that the target 
may have been lacking before. It follows that the managers at a quality target would 
likely exert their power and influence over the board and other investors in endorsing the 
firm’s acquisition by a socially responsible acquirer.
Low ownership concentration among the top managers on the other hand causes 
them to be more susceptible to counsel and monitoring pressure from the board (Johnson 
et al., 1993) and other key investors. Thus, although such managers may find it beneficial 
for the firm to be acquired by a socially responsible firm, their preference for such an 
acquisition may be overruled by the dominant owners and the board. Principal-agent 
problems are also more likely to result in governance arrangements where managers with 
low ownership proportions fail to maximize shareholder wealth since they have an 
incentive to consume perquisites (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Other negative outcomes 
from low managerial ownership holdings include a higher incidence o f corporate crime 
(Alexander & Cohen, 1999), shirking behavior (Demsetz & Lehn 1985), excessive
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investments in pet projects (Jensen, 1986; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997), and engagement in 
short-term activities and other opportunistic behaviors that increase their personal wealth 
(Dalton et al., 2003; Malatesta & Walkling, 1988). Managers with low levels of 
ownership may therefore be less committed to long-term value-maximization of the firm. 
Therefore, they may not be as motivated to ensure that their firm is acquired by a 
‘trustworthy partner’ that would ensure long-term success of the venture. To them, the 
avenues to increase their perquisites may be more attractive, and may be open to sell to 
the highest bidder regardless o f the intentions o f the said acquirer.
In sum, managers with higher levels o f ownership will likely care more about 
their firm. Given that they have worked diligently in the past to ensure the success and 
quality o f the venture, they would want their firm to pass on to a ‘good steward’, and will 
therefore exert their influence to ensure that their firm is acquired by a socially 
responsible firm that would assure long-term value creation. Conversely, managers with 
low ownership stakes may not be in a position to influence the dominant owners and the 
board to approve an acquisition by a socially responsible firm. In addition, they may not 
be as committed to the long-term success of the firm, since their desire for perquisites 
may be higher than their desire to ensure long-term success. The foregoing discussion 
leads up to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis three. The relationship between the acquirer's corporate social 
performance and the quality o f the target is stronger when the target firm's TMT 
ownership is higher.
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2.5.3 The Moderating Effect of Entrepreneurial Firms
Entrepreneurial firms are young, often small firms, typified by a high potential for 
growth within their industries (Baker & Aldrich, 2000). These firms exhibit higher rates 
if innovation per dollar investment in R&D when compared to the established firms in 
similar industries (Kortum & Lemer, 2000; Powell & Brantley, 1992).This is especially 
true in the initial stages of major new technologies (Freeman & Soete, 1997; Powell & 
Brantley, 1992; Shefer & Frenkel, 2005). However, they are faced with liabilities of 
newness and smallness which manifest in the form o f  limited internal resources and 
external relations, a lack of legitimacy (Gartner, Bird, & Starr, 1992; Mudambi & 
Treichel, 2005), and a lack of political and market power (Katila et al., 2008).
The resource dependence theory perspective (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) suggests 
that entrepreneurial firms faced with challenges in accessing needed critical resources 
may seek to be acquired by more established, resource-rich firms in order to ensure their 
survival. Established firms, on the other hand, may be willing to provide such resources 
to target entrepreneurial firms because of the targets’ ability to avail complementary 
resources such as access to technology (Mason & Rohner, 2002; Wadhwa & Kotha, 
2006) and innovative capabilities that would be difficult to develop in-house (Cefis & 
Marsili, 2011; Coff, 1999; Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Ranft & Lord, 2002). In addition, 
apart from resource acquisition motives, entrepreneurs may seek an acquisition of their 
firm for other reasons including the need to relieve personal pressures, to eliminate 
stressful managerial responsibilities, and to achieve financial independence (Graebner et 
al., 2010).
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Regardless o f the motives behind their intention to sell, entrepreneurs are likely to 
have a high affective attachment to their firms (Palmer & Barber, 2001). As a result, they 
will hold a strong desire to sell their company to a firm that would most likely operate 
with a high regard for their firm’s long-term success. Since potential socially responsible 
acquirers will have developed a high level of reputational capital through their CSR 
activity (Fombrun et al., 2000; Gardberg & Fombrun, 2006), they may be viewed as 
having a greater capacity to attend to the interests o f the entrepreneurial firm’s present 
and future sets o f  multiple stakeholders (Preston & Sapienza, 1990). This may in turn 
give the entrepreneurs an assurance that their firm’s performance will be sustained in the 
long-term (Greenley & Foxall, 1997). In addition, engagement in CSR activity presents a 
potential acquirer as a trustworthy business partner, which eliminates the need for 
elaborate safeguards by the entrepreneurs to ensure that their firm’s interests will be 
looked after. However, potential acquirers that are less socially responsible may not be as 
highly reputed, and may even suffer negative consequences such as a loss o f reputation 
and stakeholder support when they have been found to engage in a socially irresponsible 
manner (Lange & Washburn, 2012). All else equal, given that a good reputation is 
appealing to potential business partners, employees, and customers (Fischer & Reuber, 
2007; Fombrun, 2001; Fombrun & Shanley, 1990; Jones, 1995; Puncheva, 2008), the 
quality entrepreneurial firm may prefer to be acquired by a socially responsible firm.
Socially responsible acquirers, on the other hand, would essentially want to 
acquire a quality firm that maximizes the return on investment. In order to minimize 
potential negative performance and reputational outcomes arising from a 'bad’ 
acquisition, they are likely to undertake more due diligence to ensure that the
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entrepreneurial target has not engaged in activity that may lead to negative performance 
effects. Indeed, studies show that engagement in socially irresponsible activities by 
organizations may lead to negative reputation, increases in the cost of capital, network 
partner loss, lawsuits, losses through sales declines and settlements, and market share 
deterioration (e.g., Baucus & Baucus, 1997; Davidson, Worrell, & Cheng, 1994; 
Haunschild, Sullivan, & Page, 2006; Karpoff et al., 2008; Lange & Washburn, 2012; 
Strachan, Smith, & Beedles, 1983). As a result of their thorough background checks, the 
socially responsible acquirers would likely end up acquiring quality entrepreneurial firms 
that guarantee future synergies, which would more likely translate to positive post­
acquisition performance.
Hypothesis four. The relationship between the acquirer's corporate social 
performance and the quality of the target is stronger when the target firm is an 
entrepreneurial firm.
2.5.4 The Moderating Effect of Family Ownership
A family business can be defined as “ ...a  business governed and/or managed with 
the intention to shape and pursue the vision of the business held by a dominant coalition 
controlled by members o f the same family or a small number o f families in a manner that 
is potentially sustainable across generations of the family or families” (Chua, Chrisman, 
& Sharma., 1999: 25). Agency theory suggests that management by a dominant coalition 
of shareholders [a family in this case] should be positively related to performance, since 
their interests should be more inclined toward increasing the value of the firm, which 
subsequently diminishes agency problems (Berle & Means, 1933; Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). Given the controlling family’s demands for continued financial, career, and
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‘altruistic’ benefits from the firm (Schulze et al., 2001), there is a high impetus for the 
family to maximize the long-term value of the firm (Morck et al., 2005; Schulze et al.,
2001). Indeed, a number of studies (e.g., Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Leach & Leahy, 1991; 
McConaughy, Walker, Henderson, & Mishra 1998; Villalonga & Amit, 2006) conclude 
that family firms do better on market valuation and on return on assets when compared to 
other major corporations.
Family firms have been found to pay more attention to nonfmancial 
“socioemotional” aspects that meet the family’s affective needs independent of financial 
considerations (Berrone et al., 2010; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). For a family target, 
socioemotional needs may include projecting and perpetuating a positive family image 
and reputation (Sharma & Manikutty, 2005; Westhead et al., 2001), receiving recognition 
for generous actions (Schulze, Lubatkin, & Dino, 2003), and accumulation o f social 
capital (Arregle et al., 2007). Since proactive socially responsible activities are associated 
with a deeper and broader coverage of stakeholders (Buysse & Verbeke, 2003), 
engagement in such activities by potential acquirers may be viewed favorably by quality 
family targets. This is because the favorable resultant reputation from the socially 
responsible firm would ‘spill over’ to the target, effectively boosting the family’s 
socioemotional wealth in the process. In addition, since favorable stakeholder evaluations 
are important for maintenance of the family’s socioemotional wealth, engagement in 
socially responsible activities by a potential acquirer expresses that acquirer’s deeper 
attention to stakeholders, which boosts the family’s preference to be acquired by such a 
firm. All else equal, a quality family target is likely to be more attracted to a socially
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responsible acquirer because the mere acquisition by the socially responsible firm would 
boost the family firm’s image and reputation among its key stakeholders.
From the acquirer’s perspective, a family target may be more attractive for a 
number of reasons. First, a quality family target will likely be more successful than its 
industry peers (Ravenscraft & Scherer, 1988; Walsh & Kosnik, 1993). In addition, given 
that family firms hold non-financial motives in a higher regard as opposed to financial 
motives (Berrone et al., 2010), family firms’ values and strategies may be better aligned 
wit i those of the socially responsible firms. The value congruence between the family 
firm and the acquirer may therefore lead to an increased likelihood that the acquisition 
will lead to higher post-acquisition performance. In sum, it is argued that the advantages 
stemming from being a socially responsible firm and those that emanate from being a 
well-performing family firm will reinforce each other and lead to synergistic fit between 
the firms (Graebner & Eisenhardt, 2004).
Hypothesis five. The relationship between the acquirer's corporate social 
performance and the quality of target is stronger when the target firm is a family 
business.
2.5.5 Acquirer CSR and Target TMT Retention
Extant research supports the notion that quality human capital is associated with 
superior organizational outcomes (e.g., Bosma, Van Praag, Thurik, & De Wit, 2004; 
Bruederl, Preisendorfer, & Ziegler, 1992; Cassar, 2006; Cooper, Gimeno-Gascon, & Woo 
1994; Dyke, Fischer, & Reuber, 1992; Van der Sluis, Van Praag, & Vijverberg, 2005). 
Proponents for the retention of the targets’ TMT have argued that previous knowledge 
about their firm should intensify alertness to emerging opportunities (Westhead,
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Ucbasaran, & Wright 2005). Similarly, others (e.g., Ellis et al., 2011; Krug et al., 2014) 
maintain that the target’s managers may have embedded knowledge of their firm, 
industry experience, and established relationships with stakeholders that the acquiring 
firm may find difficult to replicate quickly. In addition, over the duration of their tenure, 
the target TMT is likely to have developed a rich body of organizational wisdom, which 
would be invaluable in providing a better understanding of various aspects of the 
acquisition. Examples include the traditions and history of the acquired company's 
culture; its long-term relationships with customers, vendors and suppliers; prior successes 
and failures of the firm; and the underlying structure of its political conflicts (Bergh,
2001; Buono, Bowditch, & Lewis, 1985; Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991; Jemison & Sitkin, 
1986).
However, in a recent review, Krug et al. (2014) document that target companies 
lose an average of about 25 percent o f their top managers within a year after being 
acquired; and within five years, they lose an average of 60 percent or more of their top 
managers. The turnover trend is especially pronounced following an acquisition by non- 
US firms (Furtado & Karan, 1990; Krug & Hegarty, 1997; Martin & McConnell, 1991; 
Walsh, 1988,1989; Walsh & Ellwood, 1991). Two perspectives can help explain this. 
First, from the acquirer’s perspective, letting the target TMT leave may help to minimize 
resistance during the integration process (Cannella & Hambrick, 1993; Walsh, 1989) and 
may signal to target employees that the acquirer is in charge (Krug et al., 2014 ). Target 
TMT members may also become obsolete after an international acquirer repatriates the 
acquired technology (Krug & Hegarty, 1997). Second, from the executives’ perspective, 
the top managers may have a negative assessment o f the long-term effects of the
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acquisition to their personal and professional lives (Krug & Hegarty, 2001), and they may 
perceive a loss o f status (Hambrick & Cannella, 1993), diminished autonomy (Lubatkin, 
Schweiger, & Weber, 1999), and stress following the acquisition (Schweiger & Denisi, 
1991; Schweiger & Walsh, 1990), hence motivating them to leave.
Quality acquisition targets often outperform their competitors (Ravenscraft & 
Scherer, 1987; Walsh & Kosnik, 1993). Their good performance is likely to have 
attracted an audience from various stakeholders, who constantly gauge how the target is 
doing based on the particular audience’s unique perspective. Prior to the acquisition, the 
target’s strategies and operations are likely to have been evaluated favorably by its 
various stakeholder audiences, which may have conferred legitimacy and enabled the 
target to access key resources (e.g., Parsons, 1960; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Since firms 
are viewed as a reflection o f their top managers (Hambrick & Mason, 1984), the 
audiences will likely view the top managers as a key ingredient to the success attained by 
the target. In order maintain these positive evaluations from the audiences and maintain a 
good reputation (Hall, 1992) and trust (Jones, 1995), the socially responsible acquirer 
will likely maintain the target’s TMT.
Research suggests that both voluntary and involuntary turnover undermine the 
stable social relationships that provide the basis for workplace trust and collaboration 
(Batt & Colvin, 2011; Leana & Van Buren, 1999). Efforts toward retention of the target 
TMT may minimize the impact of disruptions that come with an acquisition. That way, 
the socially responsible acquirer is able to show the target’s employees and other key 
resource providers that it has not come to destroy what they have built, but rather, that it 
is there to build a mutually beneficial partnership. A failure to keep the target managers
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in place on the other hand may invoke perceptions o f mistrust from various constituents 
(Blois, 2003) since it may destabilize some existing relationships between the target firm 
and its stakeholders. In addition, the social networks that the target’s TMT may have 
relied on to provide key resources may be severed after the executives’ departure.
A firm's social performance is frequently assessed in regard to local communities, 
women and minorities, employee relations, the natural environment, and the quality o f 
products or services (Johnson & Greening, 1999; Mahoney & Thome, 2005). Since a 
higher level o f employee motivation may lead to higher quality production (Schlesinger 
& Heskett, 1991), the socially responsible firm would be open to implementing measures 
meant either to maintain or increase the current level of motivation in the target to ensure 
quality in their processes. The target’s TMT is likely to have built allegiances from 
various employee groups, which may have led to an integration o f values, leading to 
employee motivation that resembles intrinsic motivation and higher commitment to 
organizational goals (Ryan & Deci, 2000). The employees may have come to tmst their 
top managers over time and may have reflected their loyalty through higher efforts 
towards making the firm successful. The attrition of the managers they had come to 
identify with may work to erode this loyalty, which may in turn lower motivation and 
subsequently lead to poorer organizational outcomes. In addition, TMT attrition may also 
negatively affect employees’ perceptions of job security, as they may feel that their own 
jobs may be at stake. The socially responsible firm may find it beneficial to maintain the 
target’s TMT as a motivation tool for the employees to continue providing high quality 
products or services to the customers. Target TMT departures, on the other hand, may 
undermine employee motivation through an erosion o f employee allegiances and
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disruptions to the organization’s operational and shared functions (Dess & Shaw, 2001; 
Park & Shaw, 2013; Shaw, Duffy, Johnson, & Lockhart, 2005). This may in turn be 
reflected in the production of lower quality products or provision of lower quality 
services by the employees.
Hypothesis six. The acquirer's corporate social performance is positively related 
to the retention of the target firm's TMT human capital.
2.5.6 The Mediating Effect of TMT Retention
The foregoing discussion has established a motive behind the retention of the 
target TMTs by the acquirer. Various scholars (e.g., Baum, Locke, & Smith., 2001; Frese 
et al., 2007) have argued that quality o f human capital has a positive impact on a firm’s 
planning and venture strategy, which subsequently has a positive effect on the firm’s 
performance. In addition, the upper echelons perspective maintains that the top managers' 
experiences, values, and personalities greatly influence their interpretations o f the 
situations they face, which in turn affects their decision making (Carpenter, Geletkanycz, 
& Sanders, 2004; Hambrick, 2007; Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Thus, characteristics such 
as education (Wiersema & Bantel, 1992), functional backgrounds (Kimberly & Evanisko, 
1981), psychological dispositions (Miller & Droge, 1986), and age and tenure at the 
target firm (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990) have all contributed to the top managers’ 
ability to lead the target to its current success level. In order to maintain this high level of 
performance, the acquirer will be more inclined to retain the target executives, since they 
have proven themselves to be capable managers. In addition, given the disruptive nature 
of an acquisition to a firm’s processes, TMT departure may worsen the intensity o f the 
disruptions following an acquisition (Cannella & Hambrick, 1993; Hambrick & Cannella,
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1993; Krishnan, Miller, & Judge, 1997), negatively affecting post-acquisition 
performance. The organizational wisdom gained by the target’s executives over their 
tenure places them in a unique position to provide invaluable counsel on important 
aspects o f the target such as its culture, key relationships, and prior failures and 
successes, which may have important implications for future performance.
From a resource based perspective (Barney, 1991; Conner, 1991; Wemerfelt, 
1984), it could also be argued that since the target TMT’s tacit knowledge led to high 
performance, the best way to sustain the high performance into the future is through 
executive retention (Berman, Down, & Hill, 2002). The resource based view would also 
suggest that in order to ensure a sustained competitive advantage, retention of the target 
TMT is important as it ensures that the unique organizational knowledge the TMT has 
attained over time is kept within the organization and is not acquired by competitors 
(Kiessling & Harvey, 2006). Further, Graebner (2004) argues that acquired firms’ 
managers can help realize expected and serendipitous value. Graebner maintains that 
‘expected value’ can be achieved through mobilizing actions [i.e., providing internal 
pacing and accelerating interaction with the buyers] and mitigating actions [i.e., 
expediting resolution of employees' concerns and through real-time communications]. 
Serendipitous value, on the other hand, is achieved by identifying opportunities for 
unexpected resource reconfiguration.
From the foregoing discussion, the socially responsible acquirer firm would likely 
find it important to retain the target’s top management team in order to continue gaining 
from their positive evaluations from various constituents, their tacit knowledge, and their
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established relationships with stakeholders. Consequently, their retention should 
subsequently lead to higher post-acquisition performance.
Hypothesis seven. The relationship between the acquirer's corporate social 
performance and acquisition performance is mediated by the retention of the 
target firm's human capital
CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY
This chapter provides an in-depth explanation of the techniques used in the 
generation of the sample, operationalization of the variables and the statistical procedures 
that were employed in hypothesis testing. The chapter begins by outlining the sample, the 
sources of data utilized and the process used to generate the sample, followed by an 
examination of the operationalization of the variables. The chapter concludes with a 
discussion of the analytical procedures utilized in hypothesis testing.
3.1 Sample
The primary objective of this dissertation is to investigate the effect of corporate 
social performance on post-acquisition performance. I began by extracting the list of all 
completed corporate acquisitions carried out by listed corporations between January 1, 
2000 and December 31. 2010 from the M&A module of the Securities Data 
Corporation’s (SDC) database. This time period was chosen because it ensures that our 
data are fairly recent, therefore making our findings more relevant in the CSR and 
acquisitions contexts. I limited my sample to deals that were worth at least USD 100 
million. These transactions represent economically significant events for the acquirers 
(Allatta & Singh, 2011), meaning that the acquirer is highly motivated to ensure the 
success o f the acquisition. I then matched the SDC acquisitions data with KLD data to
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eliminate those firms that did not have their acquirer’s corresponding social performance 
data reported. After performing these procedures, it was noted that some of the firms 
engaged in multiple acquisitions, which could bring about confounding effects among 
these observations (Hayward, 2003). Consistent with prior research (e.g., Ellis, Reus, 
Lamont, & Ranft, 2011), for those firms engaged in more than one acquisition in the 
sample, 1 only focused on the most recent acquisition. After eliminating firms with 
missing data, the final sample consisted of 354 firms.
Performance data were collected from the Research Insight database. Any missing 
financial data were obtained or computed from Standard Sc Poor’s Capital IQ database. 
This database provides data and analytics to institutional investors, investment and 




Post-acquisition firm performance was the dependent variable for this 
dissertation. One accounting measure, the return on assets (ROA) and one market 
measure, the total shareholder return (TSR) were the measures of performance used in 
this study. The ROA was deemed appropriate for the following reasons. First, 
explorations of long-term acquisition performance frequently utilize accounting measures 
of performance, particularly ROA in their measurement (e.g. Barkema & Schijven, 2008; 
Le, Park, & Kroll, 2014; Zollo Sc Singh, 2004). Second, ROA is also widely used in the 
strategy literature as a measure of performance (e.g., King Sc Zeithaml, 2001; Lavie, 
2007; McNamara, Haleblian, & Dykes, 2008; McNamara, Luce, Sc Tompson, 2002; Wan
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& Hoskisson, 2003). Third, ROA was also preferred because it is the standard in the CSR 
literature (Barnett & Salomon, 2012).
Many scholars, especially those investigating short-term acquisition performance 
have often utilized market measures o f performance such as abnormal returns (e.g. 
Carow, Heron, & Saxton, 2004; Haleblian, & Finkelstein, 1999) and holding period 
returns (e.g. Ritter, 1991) in their investigations. In order to further validate my findings 
and address any shortcomings o f using ROA as the performance indicator, I further 
utilized the TSR to further lend credence to my findings. TSR consists o f the year-end 
closing price o f a firm's stock plus adjusted dividends divided by the stock return from 
the previous year. It reflects the one-year total gain (loss) a shareholder received for 
holding the firm's common shares 'Bloom & Milkovich, 1998).
3.3 Independent Variable
3.3.1 Corporate Social Performance
CSP data were obtained from the Kinder, Lydenberg, and Domini (KLD) 
database. This database has widely been used in prior studies investigating CSP (e.g., 
Barnett & Salomon, 2012; Graves & Waddock, 1994; Luo et al., 2015; McWilliams & 
Siegel, 2000; Waddock & Graves, 1997). It is also widely used by various experts 
including investment professionals in the construction of investment portfolios, and is 
considered to be an objective measure o f CSP (Jayachandran et al., 2013). Its CSP 
measures have been shown to exhibit sufficient psychometric properties and construct 
validity (Hillman & Keim, 2001; Mattingly & Berman, 2006; Sharfman, 1996).
In constructing the database, KLD’s experts carefully monitor and rate firm CSP 
along 13 social performance criteria - seven key stakeholder attributes (corporate
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governance, community relations, employee relations, product safety, diversity, human 
rights, and the environment), and six other attributes pertaining to whether the firm is 
engaged in controversial activities (i.e., the production, sale, or service of alcohol, 
gambling, firearms, military, nuclear power, and/or tobacco). The metrics utilized in the 
database classify firm social performance in terms of either ‘strengths’ represented by +1, 
‘weaknesses/concerns’ represented by -1 or a neutral score represented by a 0 (zero) for 
each of the seven dimensions o f social performance.
Consistent with prior literature (e.g., Choi & Wang, 2009; Graves, Waddock, & 
Kelly, 2005; Hillman & Keim, 2001), a simple summation and subtraction procedure was 
used to arrive at a comprehensive measure of CSR. For each of the dimensions, the 
following procedure was utilized: (1) the total sum of the KLD ‘Strengths5 ratings was 
computed; (2) the total of KLD ‘weaknesses5 ratings was computed; (3) the total 
‘weaknesses’ were subtracted from the total ‘strengths’ in order to arrive at a net score 
for each dimension.
Many prior studies (e.g., Choi & Wang, 2009; Koh et al., 2014; Waddock & 
Graves, 1997b) have excluded the corporate governance and human rights dimensions of 
the KLD measures and have only utilized five out o f the seven stakeholder dimensions in 
the computation of an aggregate measure of corporate social performance. Hillman & 
Keim (2001) justify this practice by arguing that these five dimensions relate directly to 
the primary stakeholder groups of the firm other than capital suppliers. Other than 
adopting this practice, all the seven dimensions of CSR were adopted in this study in 




Entrepreneurial firms are young, often small firms, with high growth potential 
(Baker & Aldrich, 2000). In their operationalization of what an entrepreneurial firm is, 
researches have often adopted somewhat different thresholds of firm age. For example, 
IPO researchers have regularly utilized a ten year threshold since a firm’s founding in 
determining whether a firm is in the entrepreneurial stage (e.g., Carpenter, Pollock, & 
Leary, 2003; Le, Kroll, & Walters, 2013). Others in different contexts have adopted 
different thresholds including six years or less (Evans, 1987), eight years or less (e.g., 
Steams et al., 1995) or nine years (Bracker & Pearson, 1986). In this dissertation, I 
utilized an approach similar to Carpenter, Pollock, and Leary (2003) and Le, Kroll, and 
Walters (2013) in which they utilized a 10 year threshold. Based on this criterion, 
whether a firm was in its entrepreneurial stage or not was operationalized as a dummy 
variable, coded 1 if the firm was ten years old or less, and 0 otherwise.
3.4.2 Family Ownership
Many researchers have adopted differing operational definitions of what 
comprises a family firm. For example, Gallo and Sveen (1991) conceived it as a single 
family having a majority shareholding; Westhcad, Cowling, and Howorth (2001) 
conceive it as a firm in which the ordinary voting power held by the dominant family 
members exceeds 50%; Anderson and Reeb (2003) maintain that it is a firm in which a 
family member is an officer or director position; Allen & Panian (1982) and Graves and 
Thomas (2008) conceive it as a firm in which at least 10% of the shares are held by the 
family. While investigating publicly traded firms, Gomez-Mejia, Campbell, Martin,
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Hoskisson, Makri, and Sirmon (2014) conceive it as a firm in which the family controls 
more than 20% of the shares.
Given the wide array of definitions in the literature, I adopted a more conservative 
definition consistent with Gomez-Mejia et al. (2003), in which a family firm is deemed to 
be one in which the family controls 5% or more of the shares, with at least one of the 
family members sitting on the board, as determined by their family name (Sanchez- 
Bueno & Usero, 2014). Where two or more families in a single firm met this criterion, 
the family with the most shares was utilized for the study (Sanchez-Bueno & Usero, 
2014). Family firms were identified using information obtained from the firms’ SEC 
filings and were assigned a dummy variable of one if they met the criteria and zero if 
they did not meet the criteria of a family firm.
3-4.3 TMT Ownership
Higher TMT ownership may bestow a higher degree of power upon the top 
managers in board decision making, as the TMT can exploit their ownership positions to 
sway the vote in favor of key strategic issues affecting the firm (Finkelstein, 1992; Oh, 
Chang, & Martynov, 2011). In the current context, it would involve the target’s TMT 
exerting their influence over the board to favor an acquisition by a socially responsible 
firm. In line with Walters, Kroll, and Wright (2007), I conceived TMT ownership as the 
percentage of shares outstanding held by the top managers in the form of common stock, 
restricted stock, and in-the-money options reported in the proxy statement issued prior to 
the acquisition announcement. In so doing, I was able to capture the influence that the 
TMT had over the board in regard to setting the strategic direction of the target firm right
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before the acquisition. This information was obtained from the companies’ proxy 
statements filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
3.5 Mediating Variables
3.5.1 Quality of Target
I have argued that the quality of the target mediates the relationship between CSR 
and post-acquisition performance. Varying approaches have been utilized in measuring 
the quality of a firm. For example, Zheng and Stangeland (2007) measure firm quality by 
growth rates in sales and earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization. 
Sanders and Boivie (2004) contend that information about stock-based incentives may be 
an observable characteristic that may substitute for more unobservable indicators o f firm 
quality. Other measures o f firm quality that have been utilized in research include venture 
capitalist status and reputation (Hochberg et al., 2007), leverage levels (Dissanaike & 
Markar, 2009), and prior performance as measured by the firm’s risk and return 
characteristics (McGuire, Schneeweis, & Branch, 1990). Puranam et al. (2006) utilize the 
amount paid per employee of the acquired firm in millions and patent count to measure 
quality o f a firm.
In this dissertation, I utilize Tobin’s q to measure quality. Tobin's q reflects 
investor expectations about firm value relative to asset replacement cost (Bowman & 
Helfat, 2001). In their investigation on how global environmental standards affect market 
value, Dowell et al. (2000) contend that Tobin's q can be interpreted as a measure o f firm 
"quality" since better-managed firms will tend to be o f higher value. Tobin’s q was 
calculated as the book value of assets minus the book value of equity plus the market 
value of equity, divided by the book value of assets (Moeller et al., 2005).
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3.5.2 Target TMT Retention
In this paper, I argue that target TMT retention would be beneficial to the acquirer 
because their departure may worsen the intensity of the disruptions following an 
acquisition (Cannella & Hambrick, 1993; Hambrick & Cannella, 1993; Krishnan, Miller, 
& Judge, 1997), and it would lead to a loss of the organizational wisdom gained by the 
target’s executives over their tenure which would lead to a loss o f competitive advantage. 
The target TMT retention was measured as follows: First, all the top managers working 
for each target at the time of the acquisition were identified from the proxy statements. 
Next, at the end of the third year the number of TMT members that still worked for the 
firm was determined, and then it was expressed as a percentage o f the original number of 
top managers at the time of acquisition. This information was obtained through the proxy 
statements. Where such information was unavailable, especially for very large acquirers, 
an internet search for the specific individual executive was conducted.
3.6 Control Variables
Several factors that could affect post-acquisition performance were controlled for 
in order to ensure that the observed effects were a  result o f  the hypothesized 
relationships. These include:
3.6.1 Year Effects
Some authors contend that common trends observable in specific years may affect 
firm performance (Banalieva & Santoro, 2009). In order to neutralize the likelihood of 
the year o f acquisition influencing post- acquisition performance, dummy variables were 
constructed for each o f the sampling years (Le, Park & Kroll, 2014).
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3.6.2 Industry Effects
Prior research has found that the industry context and trends may affect various 
aspects of organizations within an industry, for example, new product introductions 
(Caner & Tyler, 2013) and strategic decision-making (Frederickson & Mitchell, 1984;
Hitt & Tyler, 1991). Other effects that can influence an industry could pertain to changes 
in customer tastes, competitor behavior, technology, and sources o f supply (Lawrence & 
Lorsch, 1967; Porter, 1980). These factors may subsequently influence the performance 
and profitability of firms differently in different industries, and may cause some 
industries to be more profitable than others. In order to control for these industry effects, 
dummy variables were developed by using the first two digits o f the industry SIC code 
for the acquirer.
3.6.3 Firm Size
Bigger firms may enjoy greater access to resources whose utilization would 
increase the chances o f post-acquisition performance. In addition, due to the availability
of resources and access to expertise, it is also plausible that larger firms may have had
experience handling acquisitions. Such prior acquisition experience may avail many 
opportunities for learning, thereby boosting the chances o f acquisition success. The log of 
total assets was used to control for firm size.
3.6.4 Technological Relatedness
Prior research has shown that technological relatedness between acquirer and 
target firms may positively affect post-acquisition performance (e.g., Cassiman,
Colombo, Garrone, & Veugelers, 2005; Cloodt et ai., 2006). Indeed, Rumelt (1974), in 
his study of how patterns of diversification and structure affected corporate financial
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performance, found that firms with related portfolios seem to outperform those with 
unrelated portfolios. This finding is also supported by Robins and Wiersema (1995). 
Following prior research (Le et al., 2014; Puranam, Singh & Zollo, 2006), technological 
relatedness was measured as a as a dummy variable coded 1 if the acquirer and the target 
fell within the same four-digit SIC classification, and 0 otherwise.
3.6.5 Prior Performance
Prior firm performance may affect the way acquirers handle acquisitions, which in 
turn, may impact post-acquisition outcomes. Supporting this perspective, Roll (1986) 
argues that superior firm performance in prior periods may lead to more acquisitions due 
to managerial hubris (Roll, 1986). Good firm performance in previous years may also 
influence acquisition performance by making it easier and cheaper to obtain acquisition 
financing (Haunschild & Beckman, 1998), which may subsequently avail ample 
resources to ensure post-acquisition success. Poor prior performance may also influence 
post-acquisition performance by incentivizing managers to try new pursuits, which may 
lead to a preference to acquire new businesses (Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1990). Such 
managers have a strong motivation to invest their time and efforts to ensure that the 
acquisition is successful because their careers may depend on it. Following Le et al. 
(2014), the measure utilized as a control for prior performance was the average ROA for 
the three years prior to the acquisition.
3.6.6 Slack Resources
Inter-organizational transfers after an acquisition are associated with a great deal 
of ambiguity and uncertainty, and managers must attempt to identify and take steps to 
buffer against such uncertainty (Haunschild, 1994). Slack resources can be used as a
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buffer against such uncertainty (Reuer & Leiblein, 2000) and can therefore have a 
substantial impact on post-acquisition performance (Iyer & Miller, 2008). Post­
acquisition slack resources were measured as the average cash and cash equivalents over 
the three year period after an acquisition (Le, Park & Kroll (2014).
3.6.7 Number of Acquisitions
Acquisition experience may affect post-acquisition performance because it may 
influence the timing of a specific acquisition decision, and therefore its eventual success 
(Klepper & Simons, 2000; Noda & Collis, 2001; Zollo & Reuer, 2001). Consistent with 
prior literature (e.g., Beckman, Haunschild, & Phillips, 2004; Carow et al., 2004; 
Haunschild, 1993), I account for acquisition experience by counting the number of 
acquisitions made by an acquiring firm in the three-year period immediately before the 
focal acquisition was made.
3.6.8 Bid Type
Prior research has shown that the type of bid can affect post-acquisition outcomes. 
For example, a hostile takeover undertaken with the conviction that the target’s 
management team is inefficient may result in higher managerial turnover (Raj & Forsyth,
2002). However, a  friendly acquisition undertaken primarily with an objective of reaping 
mutual synergies for both firms may result in lower top management turnover. The bid 
type was measured as a as a dummy variable coded one if  the acquisition was friendly in 
nature and zero otherwise.
3.7 Analytical Method
A hierarchical regression analysis was conducted in order to test the hypotheses. 
Going by the techniques suggested by Cohen and Cohen (1993) and Sharma, Durand, and
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Gur-Arie, (1981), a moderated regression analysis was performed to test for the 
moderator effects. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis was deemed suitable 
for this analysis because the data is cross-sectional and therefore does not suffer from 
autocorrelation problems. The general model utilized in this study was:
Post-acquisition ROA tO+3 or Total shareholder return tO+3 = f  (Year effects tO 
+Industry effects tO + Firm size tO + Technological relatedness tO + prior performance + 
slack resources + Bid Type + No. o f Acquisitions + CSR + target TMT retention tO+3 + 
entrepreneurial firm tO + entrepreneurial firm tO x CSR tO+3 + entrepreneurial firm tO x 
target TMT retention tO+3 + Family ownership tO + Family ownership tO x CSR tO+3 + 
Family ownership tO x TMT retention tO+3 + TMT Ownership tO + TMT Ownership tO x 
CSR tO+3 + TMT Ownership tO x TMT retention tO+3). Three represents the third year 
post-acquisition data.
Since there were two dependent variables, two sets of models were developed for 
each hypothesis directly investigating firm performance as a dependent variable. One set 
of models examined the effect o f CSR on the third year, post-acquisition ROA changes, 
while the other set o f models examined the effect of CSR on the third year post­
acquisition TSR changes. In conducting the hierarchical regression analysis, the 
following models were constructed for each set. The first only included the control 
variables, the second included control variables and main effect, and the third full model 
added all variables including “interaction” variables. The change in the amount of 
variance explained (R ) was computed for each model.
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3.7.1 Tests of Mediation
Mediating effects are proposed in hypothesis 2 and hypothesis 7. Baron and 
Kenny (1986) suggest that for mediation to be supported, the following conditions must 
be met; first, the independent variable should be significantly related to the mediator; 
second, the independent variable should be significantly related to the dependent 
variable; third, the mediator should be significantly related to the dependent variable; and 
fourth, in the presence of the mediator, the relationship between the independent and the 
dependent variable should become insignificant. All these paths will be tested in order to 
ascertain whether mediating effects are indeed present.
CHAPTER 4
DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
This chapter presents the results of the data analysis. It starts with the presentation 
of the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix of the variables used in the study. Next, 
the results o f the hierarchical regressions used to test the hypotheses are presented along 
with the tests of the hypotheses.
4.1 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
Table 4.1 presents the correlation matrix for the variables in this study.
Correlation analysis may help with gaining an initial understanding of the relationships 
existent among various variables. It may also be utilized in making an initial judgment as 
to whether multicoilinearity exists among the variables. Some of the initial observations 
of the data are as follows. For our measures of performance, the average return on assets 
(ROA) for the three years after an acquisition was 3.63, while the mean total shareholder 
return (TSR) for the three years after an acquisition was 3.34. On average, top managers 
owned 7% in the target firms right before they were acquired. For our quality measure 
the average Tobin's Q for the target firms was 2.23. ROA and CSR appear to be strongly 
positively correlated, which provides initial support for our hypothesis that CSR is 
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In the third year, the average retention rate for the top management team present 
at the time of acquisition is 35 percent. This means that approximately 65 percent of the 
managers had left within the first three years. Prior research found similar TMT turnover 
rates (e.g., Furtado & Karan, 1990; Hambrick & Cannella, 1993; Krishnan, Miller, & 
Judge, 1997; Krug & Hegarty, 1997; Martin & McConnell, 1991; Walsh, 1989; Walsh & 
Ellwood, 1991).
The correlation table also reveals that some significant intercorrelations between 
some independent variables. For example, CSR is significantly correlated with average 
cash and cash equivalents, the assets and the number of acquisitions. TMT ownership is 
also significantly correlated with family ownership, and assets. Entrepreneurial firm 
status is significantly correlated with industry effects. Family ownership is significantly 
correlated with total assets and number of acquisitions. Tobin’s Q is significantly 
correlated with industry effects. Prior three year average ROA was significantly 
correlated with industry effects whiie average cash was significantly related to total assets 
and number of acquisitions. Year effects were significantly correlated with technological 
relatedness and number of acquisitions, while total assets were significantly related to the 
number o f acquisitions.
The above noted intercorrelations between some o f the independent variables may 
imply that there may be problems with multicollinearity. In order to check for 
multicollinearity, I calculated the variance inflation factors for the independent variables. 
The variance inflation factors for all the independent variables in the study are presented 
in Table 4.2. Hair et al. (1987) and Chatteijee and Rice (1977) suggest that variance 
inflation factors that are lower than 10 indicate that multicollinearity may not seriously
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affect the OLS results. The mean VIF was 1.14 and none of the resultant variance 
inflation factors was greater than 10. Thus, consistent with the recommendations by Hair 
et al. (1987) and Chatterjee and Rice (1977), I concluded that multicollinearity may not 
be a serious issue.



















Two sets of models were developed in order to test the predictions of the 
hypotheses. In the first set, the effects o f the independent variables on the three year 
return on assets, the accounting measure of performance, were examined. In the second 
set, the effects o f the independent variables on the market measure o f performance, the 
total shareholder return were examined.
A number of estimations were performed in order to ensure that my OLS results 
were unbiased. 1 created plots o f the standard residuals against predicted dependent
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values for my models, which indicated that the residuals were randomly distributed 
around zero. A closer look at my residuals indicated that ten residuals had values that 
were greater than the absolute value of two. These are likely to be outliers, and they may 
unduly influence the findings. Consistent with prior research (e.g., Nehrt, 1996), I deleted 
these observations in order to remove their effects. Next, I performed the Breusch-Pagan 
test and White's test for heteroskedasticity test to investigate heteroskedasticity in my 
models. Both of these tests indicated that there is heteroskedasticity in my models. I then 
plotted a q-q plot to assess the normality of the residuals. The residuals reasonably fell 
close to a straight line, which indicated that their distribution was reasonably normal.
4.3 Hypothesis Tests and Results
The results of the analyses are presented in Tables 4.3 to 4.15. Table 4.3 presents 
the results o f regression analyses examining the effect of CSR on post-acquisition 
performance, measured by ROA. Table 4.4 presents the results of regression analyses 
examining the effect o f CSR on post-acquisition performance, measured by Total 
Shareholder Return. Table 4.5 displays the results of the regression models examining the 
moderating effect of TMT ownership, entrepreneurial firm and family firm status on the 
on the relationship between CSR and quality o f target relationship. Table 4.6 presents the 
regression analyses examining the relationship between CSR and TMT retention. Table
4.7 follows with the results of regression analyses examining the mediating effect of 
TMT retention on the relationship between CSR and three year average ROA. Finally, 
Table 4.8 is presented and it shows the results of regression analyses examining the 
mediating effect of TMT retention on the relationship between CSR and three year 
average TSR.
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Hypothesis one predicts that the acquirer's corporate social performance is 
positively related to its acquisition performance. Table 4.3 model two presents this test 
with the performance measure being ROA. The model shows that the relationship is 
positive and significant (b=0.09, p<0.05), therefore providing support for hypothesis one. 
This finding reinforces prior research (e.g., Wang & Qian, 2011; Waddock & Graves, 
1997a) that has concluded that corporate social responsibility positively affects financial 
performance. Hypothesis one was also tested with TSR as the performance measure in 
Table 4.4 model two. However, this test yielded no significant relationship between CSR 
and TSR. This finding is consistent with Gilley et al.’s (2000) conclusion that on average, 
CSR initiatives do may not affect a firm’s future market performance. Given the two 
differing findings, this leads to the conclusion that hypothesis one is partially supported.
Hypothesis two proposes that the quality o f target mediates the relationship 
between CSR and organizational performance. Baron and Kenny (1986) suggest that for 
mediation to be supported, the following conditions must be met; first, the independent 
variable should be significantly related to the mediator; second, the independent variable 
should be significantly related to the dependent variable; third, the mediator should be 
significantly relat d to the dependent variable; and fourth, in the presence of the 
mediator, the relationship between the independent and the dependent variable should 
become insignificant.
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Table 4-3: Results of regression analyses examining the effect of CSR on three year
average ROA.
Model 1 Model 2
P s.e P s.e
Intercept 2.33 1.78 2.54 1.8
Prior 3yr ROA 0.34*** 0.06 034*** 0.05
Slack resources -0.00* 0 -0.00*** 0
Year effects -0.08 0.1 -0.08 0.1
Industry effects -0.03** 0.01 -0.03** 0.01
Log assets 0.39 0.26 0.32 0.27
Technological 0.01 0.5 0.1 0.5relatedness
Bid type 0.3 1.24 0.3 1.25
No of acquisitions 0.05** 0.02 0.04* 0.02
CSR 0.09** 0.04
r 2 0.415*** 0.423**
AR2 0.008
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
Table 4-4: Results of regression analyses examining the effect of CSR on three year 
average total shareholder return.
Model 1 Model 2
P s.e P s.e
Intercept 21.66** 9.42 21.81** 9.42
Prior 3yr ROA -0.05 0.16 -0.05 0.16
Slack resources 0 0 0 0
Year effects 0.46 0.52 0.46 0.52
Industry effects -0.04 0.07 -0.04 0.07
Log assets -2.7* 1.4 -2.75* 1.42
Technological
relatedness 4.02 2.61 4.09 2.63
Bid type -12.93* 7.57 -12.93* 7.63






* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
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The mediation test was first performed with ROA as the dependent variable. I first 
established the relationship between the independent variable (CSR) and the mediator 
variable (quality o f target). This relationship was tested in Table 4.5 (model four) and 
was found to be positive and significant (b=0.02, p<0.1). Next, 1 ascertained whether 
CSR is significantly related to the ROA. The results presented in Table 4.3 model two 
show that CSR is significantly related to ROA (b=0.09, p<0.05). I then tested v hether 
quality of target, represented by Tobin’s Q, was significantly related to ROA, the 
dependent variable. Table 4.6 model two reveals that this relationship was positive and 
significant (p=0.72, p<0.01). Finally, I added the mediator to the model to investigate its 
overall effect on the CSR and ROA relationship. Table 4.7 model three and model four 
reveal that the strength of the relationship, although remaining significant, weakened with 
the addition of the mediator from (b-0.14, p<0.01) in model 3 to (b=0.12, p<0.01) in 
model four. Rucker, Preacher, Tormala, and Petty (2011) suggest that if there remains a 
significant direct effect between the independent and dependent variable even after the 
addition of the mediator, the typical practice is to report that the mediator only partially 
mediates the relationship. Consistent with this view, I concluded that the quality of target 
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Table 4-6: Test o f the relationship between quality of target and three year average ROA.
Model 1 Model 2
P s.e P s.e
Intercept 2.33 1.78 0.38 1.92
Prior 3yr ROA 0.34*** 0.06 0.34*** 0.06
Slack resources -0.00* 0 0 0
Year effects -0.08 0.1 -0.08 0.1
Industry effects -0.03** 0.01 -0.02 0.01
Log assets 0.39 0.26 0.45* 0.26
Technological
relatedness 0.01 0.5 0.08 0.49
Bid type 0.3 1.24 0.26 1.25
No of acquisitions 0.05** 0.02 0.04** 0.02
Tobin’s Q 0.72*** 0.27
R2 0.415*** 0.433
AR2 0.01
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Another test was performed to test the mediating effect o f the quality o f target on 
the relationship between CSR and organizational performance, with TSR as the 
performance measure. The results o f the test are presented in Tables 4.8,4.9, 4.10 and
4.11.1 first established the relationship between CSR and the quality of target. This 
relationship was tested in Table 4.8 model four and was found to be positive and 
significant (b=0.02, p<0.1). I then tested whether CSR is significantly related to TSR.
The results presented in Table 4.9 model two shows no significant relationship between 
CSR and TSR. I then tested whether quality of target, represented by Tobin’s Q, was 
significantly related to TSR, the dependent variable. Table 4.10 model two reveals that 
this relationship was positive but insignificant. Finally, I added the mediator to the model 
to investigate its overall effect on the CSR and TSR relationship. Table 4.11 model three 
shows that the relationship was insignificant before the addition of the mediator, the 
quality of target. The model remained insignificant with the addition of the mediator as 
depicted in model four. This test o f mediation led to the conclusion that the quality of 
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Table 4-9: Test of the relationship between CSR and three year average TSR.
Model 1 Model 2
P s.e P s.e
Intercept 21.66** 9.42 21.81** 9.42
Prior 3yr ROA -0.05 0.16 -0.05 0.16
Slack resources 0 0 0 0
Year effects 0.46 0.52 0.46 0.52
Industry effects -0.04 0.07 -0.04 0.07
Log assets -2.7* 1.4 -2.75* 1.42
Technological
relatedness 4.02 2.61 4.09 2.63
Bid type -12.93* 7.57 -12.93* 7.63








* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01




Model 1 Model 2
P s.e P s.e
Intercept 21.66** 9.42 18.49* 10.36
Prior 3yr ROA -0.05 0.16 -0.05 0.16
Slack resources 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Year effects 0.46 0.52 0.47 0.53
Industry effects -0.04 0.07 -0.02 0.07




Bid type -12.93* 7.57 -13.00* 7.64
No of acquisitions 0.19 0.14 0.18 0.15
Tobin’s Q 1.17 1.21
R2 0.029 0.032
AR2 0.003
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Hypothesis three proposes that the relationship between the acquirer's corporate 
social performance and the quality o f target is stronger when the target firm's TMT 
ownership is higher. This relationship was tested by investigating the interaction between 
CSR and TMT ownership. Table 4.12 model four reveals that the result o f this hypothesis 
was negative and significant (b=-0.25, p<0.05), which runs contrary to the initial 
hypothesis, meaning hypothesis three was not supported.
Hypothesis four predicts that the relationship between the acquirer's corporate 
social performance and the quality o f target is stronger when the target firm is an 
entrepreneurial firm. Table 4.12 model four revealed a positive and significant 
relationship between the interaction o f CSR and Entrepreneurial firm and the quality of 
the target firm (b=0.13, p<0.01). This lends support to the fourth hypothesis.
Hypothesis five proposes that the relationship between the acquirer's corporate 
social performance and the quality o f target is stronger when the target firm is a family 
business. This hypothesis was tested in Table 4.12 model four. The interaction between 
CSR and family ownership was negative and insignificant, meaning that the results lent 
no support for the moderating effect o f family ownership on the relationship between 
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Hypothesis six predicts that the acquirer's corporate social performance is 
positively related to the retention of the target firm's TMT human capital. Table 4.13 
shows the results of the relationship between corporate social performance and TMT 
retention. The results show a negative and insignificant relationship between CSP and 
TMT retention, meaning that no support was found for hypothesis six.
Table 4-13: Results o f regression analyses examining the relationship between CSR and 
TMT retention.
Model 1 Model 2
P s.e P s.e
Intercept 0.38*** 0.13 0.37*** 0.13
Prior 3yr ROA 0.01* 0.00 0.01* 0.00
Slack resources 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Year effects 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01
Industry effects 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Log assets -0.03 0.02 -0.03 0.02
Technological relatedness -0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.03
Bid type 0.04 0.09 0.04 0.09






* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
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Hypothesis seven suggests that the relationship between the acquirer's corporate 
social performance and acquisition performance is mediated by the retention of the target 
firm's human capital. Tables 4.14 and 4.15 show the results o f the mediating effect of 
TMT retention on the relationship between corporate social performance and post­
acquisition performance. This was again tested following Baron and Kenny’s (1986) 
procedure outlined earlier. Table 4.14 shows the results of mediation with ROA as the 
post-acquisition performance measure, while Table 4.15 shows the results with TSR as 
the performance measure. In the first stage of the mediation analysis I established the 
relationship between the independent variable (CSR) and the mediator variable (TMT 
retention). This relationship was tested in Table 4.13 mode two (hypothesis six) and was 
found to be negative and insignificant, meaning that the hypothesis fails this first test. 
Next, I tested whether CSR (independent variable) is significantly related to the ROA 
(dependent variable). The results presented in Table 4.14 model three show that CSR is 
significantly related to ROA (b=0.09, p<0.05). I then tested whether TMT retention 
(mediator) was significantly related to ROA (dependent variable). Table 4.14 model two 
reveals that this relationship was negative and insignificant, which meant that the 
mediation fest failed another condition. Lastly, the mediator was added to see whether the 
relationship between CSR and ROA became insignificant. Table 4.14 model four reveals 
that this relationship remained significant (b=0.08, p<0.05). Overall the hypothesis failed 
the first and third tests, meaning that the results lend no support to the mediation effect 
proposed by hypothesis seven.
I followed the same procedure in testing the mediation effect o f TMT retention 
with TSR as the dependent variable. In the first step, the relationship between the
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independent variable (CSR) and the mediator variable (TMT retention) was found to be 
negative and insignificant in Table 4.13 model two (hypothesis six). I then tested the 
relationship between CSR and TSR. The results presented in Table 4.15 model two do 
not show a significant relationship between CSR and TSR. Next, I tested whether TMT 
retention was significantly related to TSR. Table 4.15 model three again reveals a 
positive but insignificant relationship between CSR and TSR. Lastly, on the addition of 
the mediator to the CSR-TSR relationship in Table 4.15 model four, there were no 
significant changes to the model, lending no support to the hypothesis. In sum, hypothesis 
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DISCUSSION, CONTRIBUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS
In this study, I sought to investigate the impact that corporate social responsibility 
engagement may have on post-acquisition performance outcomes. I examine this issue by 
relying on literature on stakeholder theory and signaling theory in order to understand 
how firms could shape the perceptions of prospective quality targets in their favor, 
through engagement in corporate social responsibility. In it, I argue that the positive 
reputational outcomes arising from a prospective acquirer’s engagement in socially 
responsible activities may be attractive to quality prospective target firms. This may 
increase the likelihood that the socially responsible firm would end up acquiring targets 
with high potential, which would boost post-acquisition performance. I explore 
entrepreneurial firms, family firms and top managers’ ownership as potential moderators 
to the relationship. Further, I explore top management team retention as a mediator of the 
relationship between CSR and post-acquisition performance.
5.1 Research Findings
The first major finding is that corporate social performance is generally associated 
with higher post-acquisition performance. I find a positive relationship between corporate 
social responsibility and financial performance measured by ROA. This is consistent with 
other findings in the literature (e.g., Barnett & Salomon, 2012). An interesting finding in
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the study was that no significant results were obtained when performance was measured 
using total shareholder return, a market measure. Similarly, other researchers have not 
found significant relationships between CSP and financial performance when using 
market measures o f performance (e.g., Wang & Qian, 2011; Gilley et al., 2000). Gilley et 
ah (2000) contend that these differences may stem from the fact that samples from prior 
studies were largely drawn from one, or a few similar industries as opposed to a wide 
range of industries. This assertion seems to hold some truth because, like Wang and Qian 
(2011) and Gilley et ah (2000), this study did not limit the number and nature of 
industries from which its sample was drawn. Another explanation may be that difficulties 
for market participants to interpret CSR information accurately may lead to ‘noise’ in the 
financial markets leading to volatility in financial markets (Orlitzky, 2013).
The second major finding is that entrepreneurial firm status moderated the 
relationship between the acquirer's corporate social performance and the quality o f target. 
It appears that acquisitions of entrepreneurial firms by socially responsible acquirers 
generally seem to be of higher quality, meaning that they generally outperform other 
types of targets in regard to quality.
The third major finding is that the quality of target partially mediates the 
relationship between CSR and organizational performance. More specifically, the 
association between social responsiveness by acquirers and post-acquisition performance 
seems to be strong with quality targets.
Further, contrary to predictions, the tests o f moderation indicate that top 
management ownership does not moderate the relationship between CSR and quality of 
target in the predicted positive direction. On the contrary, the effect is found to be
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negative. In addition, family ownership does not have any significant moderating effect
on the CSR-quality o f target relationship.
5.2 Theoretical Contributions
5-2.1 Contributions to CSR Literature
Research suggests that involvement with CSR can improve stakeholder relations 
(McWilliams & Siegel, 2001), and elicit positive stakeholder relations for the firm 
(Barnett, 2007). CSR engagement has been attributed to positive security analysts’ 
assessments (Ioannou & Serafeim, 2015; Luo, Wang, Raithel, & Zheng, 2015), favorable 
job seekeis’ perceptions of the firm (Jones, Willness, & Madey, 2014), lower cost of 
capital (Sharfman & Fernando, 2008) and lower capital constraints (Cheng, Ioannou, & 
Serafeim, 2014). It has also been argued that CSR provides ‘insurance-like’ benefits 
against negative environmental events that threaten firm value (Godfrey, Merrill, & 
Hansen, 2009; McGuire, Sundgren, & Schneeweis, 1988) and against litigation risk (Koh, 
Qian, & Wang, 2014). These positive CSR outcomes may ultimately lead to higher 
financial performance (e.g., Lev, Petrovits, & Radhakrishnan, 2010; Wang & Qian, 2011; 
Waddock & Graves, 1997a). Despite these documented positive outcomes from CSR 
engagement, no study has looked at its effect on acquisitions outcomes. This research 
extends prior CSR literature to the acquisitions context and shows that CSR engagement 
is associated with financial performance (e.g., Barnett & Salomon, 2012). It therefore 
establishes a stronger theoretical foundation for the relationship between corporate social 
performance and financial performance.
Some of the receivers of signals that have received research attention include 
shareholders (Connelly et al., 2011), current and prospective employees (e.g., Breaugh,
1992; McNall, 2010; Rynes, 1991), analysts, investors, and the media (Higgins & Gulati, 
2006), financial markets (Certo, 2003), consumers (Boulding, & Kirmani, 1993), among 
others. Connelly et al. (2011) call for the study of the impact of signals on additional 
stakeholders. This study answers this call by studying prospective targets as additional 
stakeholders that rely on a prospective acquirer’s CSR information to form impressions 
about potential acquirers. This study finds that, in the same way that prospective job 
seekers (e.g., Rynes, 1991; Rynes & Miller, 1983), consumers, suppliers, and investors 
(Connelly et al., 2011) may use CSR information to form impressions about the firm, 
prospective targets may also use such information in assessing the acquirers. A firm’s 
engagement in CSR is therefore proposed, and found to be a signaling mechanism 
through which prospective acquirers portray themselves as more trustworthy business 
partners to prospective quality targets.
5.2.2 Contributions to Acquisitions Literature
Studies within the M.&A literature have found that the anticipated synergies from 
acquisitions remain largely unrealized, as evidenced by poor post-acquisition 
performance (Datta, Pinches, & Narayanan, 1992; King, Dalton, Daily, & Covin, 2004). 
Some authors have argued that the decrease in the acquirer’s performance could be 
attributed to suboptimal initial integration efforts (Barkema & Schijven, 2008), loss of 
autonomy (Chatteijee, Lubatkin, Schweiger, & Weber, 1992; Very & Lubatkin, 1997), 
lower post-acquisition R&D investments (Hitt, Hoskisson, Ireland, & Harrison, 1991) 
incompatibility of acquirer and target firm cultures (Very, Lubatkin, Calori & Veiga, 
1997), bidder-to-target dissimilarity in product offerings and geographic reach (Ellis, 
Reus, Lamont, & Ranft, 2011) and hubristic CEOs’ overestimation their own capacity to
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create value when buying targets (Roll, 1986). The importance of acquirer CSP as a 
possible predictor of post-acquisition performance has largely been overlooked.
This dissertation bridges this gap in the literature by investigating the influence of 
CSP on post-acquisition outcomes The findings support the notion that an organization’s 
engagement in CSR is an important contributor to post-acquisition success. The 
reputational gains that the organization reaps from such engagement seem to be valued 
by prospective targets, which enable the acquirer to attract quality targets, which 
eventually translates to higher post-acquisition performance.
Additionally, prior M&A literature has primarily investigated performance 
phenomena from an acquirer’s perspective. This study goes further and develops 
arguments from the target’s perspective, arguing that the targets are a primary recipient o f 
signals from prospective acquirers, and that they rely on information from such signals to 
make important decisions, like which acquirer would be most favorable in an acquisition 
deal.
5.2.3 Contributions to Stakeholder and Signaling Theories
Prior studies have used stakeholder and signaling theories independently in their 
investigations of organizational phenomena related to either CSP or M&As. For example, 
stakeholder theory has been invoked in the study of the relationship between CSP and 
financial performance (Barnett & Salomon, 2012), environmental awareness o f investors 
(Flammer, 2012), the relationship between corporate diversification and CSP (Kang, 
2013), environmental litigation (Kassinis & Vafeas, 2002) among others. Signaling 
theory on the other hand has been utilized in investigations concerning the attraction of 
job seekers to socially responsible firms (Jones et al., 2014; Greening & Turban, 2000;
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Turban & Greening, 1996), ownership structures and their effect CSP dimensions 
(Johnson & Greening, 1999), IPO performance (Certo, 2003) among others.
By combining both stakeholder and signaling theories in explaining post 
acquisition performance, this study illustrates that greater insight can be drawn in the 
M&A and CSP literature when different phenomena are investigated under the lens of 
both theories. In doing so, the study introduces a prior overlooked set o f stakeholders - 
the prospective target firms.
5.3 Practical Implications
5.3.1 Implications for Acquirers
Whetten et al. (2009) suggests that organizations can be perceived as social actors 
with motivations and intentions. This study indicates that, for an acquirer intent on 
presenting itself as a good future business partner, engagement in social responsibility 
may boost its image with prospective targets. With CSP as an impression management 
tool, the acquirer is able to present itself as likeable, competent, and morally worthy 
(Jones & Pittman 1982) to prospective quality targets, increasing the likelihood of 
attaining desired outcomes and averting undesired outcomes (Schlenker,1980).
5.3.2 Implications for Targets
Organizational reputation can be used as a screening strategy to determine the true 
nature of potential partners (Weigelt & Camerer, 1988). Organizations can therefore 
establish reputations for trustworthiness in the market by avoiding opportunistic 
behaviors while doing business with others (Ring & Van de Ven, 1992). By investigating 
how engagement in CSP influences the reputations o f acquirers, this paper furthers our 
understanding of the mechanisms through which some targets opt to be acquired some
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types of companies, by specifically looking at some of the motivations driving 
management to prefer some acquirers over others.
The findings of this study indicate that when prospective quality targets are 
acquired by socially responsible firms, post-acquisition performance tends to be higher. 
This suggests that managers at quality targets can increase the likelihood that their 
decision to be acquired will lead to positive organizational outcomes by ensuring that the 
acquiring firm has been engaged in socially responsible activities in the past.
5.4 Future Research
This research reveals some fruitful areas that warrant research attention in the 
future. First, the use o f a market measure and an accounting measure to measure post 
acquisition performance seems to yield conflicting results, with ROA yielding significant 
findings and TSR yielding insignificant results. Given that this finding is particularly 
prevalent with studies that do not limit their samples to similar industries, it may mean 
that there are some variables in play that may be causing the market measures to yield 
insignificant results. Further inquiry is needed in order to tease out other factors that may 
be responsible for the conflicting performance results.
The resource based theory proponents have maintained a widely held notion in the 
literature that attrition of top executives should hurt post acquisition outcomes (e.g., 
Graebner, 2004). However, my findings do not provide any significant evidence to 
support this idea. Indeed, Krug et al. (2014) contend that in some instances, replacing 
executives may be an important source of value creation. To date, the contextual factors 
surrounding the decision for, or against retention are largely unknown. Further inquiry is
98
needed in this area in order to understand these contextual variables and how they 
ultimately affect post acquisition performance.
Relatedly, targets differ with regard to their ownership structure and stage in their 
organizational life cycle. It is conceivable that these factors affect top management 
turnover as the underlying variables may affect managerial motivations differently. For 
example, with regard to family ownership, the dominant family may require that some of 
the family members holding key positions be retained as a precondition of sale. 
Alternatively, acquirers o f entrepreneurial firms may find it beneficial to retain the top 
managers in these firms in order to continue gaining from their expertise and knowledge 
o f the business. Therefore, further research is needed in order to understand how turnover 
varies among different types of firms, given their unique ownership structures (for 
example, family firms, publicly traded firms, etc.) and the stage in their life cycle (e.g. 
entrepreneurial firms).
An important finding o f this research is that the quality target partially mediates 
the relationship between CSR and organizational performance. Rucker et al. (2011) 
contend that where partial mediation is evident, there is a clear implication that other 
indirect effects could be examined and tested empirically. Since the current scope o f the 
study does not allow for these indirect effects to be tested, future research could 
contribute to our understanding of the relationship by investigating these indirect effects.
This study primarily focused on domestic targets and acquirers. A possible avenue 
for future research would be an investigation o f international acquisitions by socially 
responsible multinational corporations. An acquirer’s international experience may affect 
its opportunity seeking behavior and its capacity to profitably manage its foreign
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investments (Anand & Deiios, 2002). Such an investigation would further clarify whether 
the outcomes found in the domestic context would be similar to those in the international 
context.
5.5 Limitations
The use o f KLD data as the single source of CSR data is seen as one of the 
limitations of this study. First, KLD only reports CSR data for large, publicly traded 
companies. This effectively eliminates private firms and smaller public firms from the 
sample. This may limit the generalizability of the findings o f the research. Second, the 
KLD dataset condenses CSP simply into strengths (represented by a +1), neutral 
(represented by a ‘0’) and weaknesses (represented by a -1) dimensions. In arriving at a 
CSR measure for each firm, I used a simple summation o f strengths and weaknesses. 
However, a simple summation may not effectively capture the full effect of CSP on 
financial performance. This is due to the fact that the information disclosed about 
different types o f CSP actions may vary in relevance and diagnosticity, and may thus 
have an effect on financial performance (Jayachandran et al., 2013). For example, 
Jayachandran and colleagues showed that while product social performance has a 
positive effect on firm performance, environmental social performance neither helps nor 
hurts firm performance. Future research could investigate how different dimensions of 
CSR could affect post acquisition performance.
My sample was limited to publicly traded acquisitions in the US worth more than 
100 million USD between 2000 and 2010. This represents only a subset of all 
acquisitions that were carried out within this time. Future research could investigate
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whether the findings are supported with other samples, for example, those involving 
smaller buyers and private targets.
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